# AFF UNT Round 3 Baylor EW vs OU LM Judge-Kelly Nickel, Nietzsche and case

### Plan Text

**The United States federal government should procure small modular reactors for use for mission critical military installations in the United States.**

### Advantage one is Grid

#### SMRs key to prevent outage and deter cyber attack

Andres and Breetz ‘11

(Richard B. Andres is Professor of ¶ national Security Strategy at the ¶ national War College and a Senior fellow and energy and environmental ¶ Security and Policy Chair in the Center ¶ for Strategic research, institute for national Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University. Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts institute of technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors ¶ for Military Installations:¶ Capabilities, Costs, and ¶ Technological Implications” Institute for National Strategic Studies, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/strforum/sf-262.pdf>, SEH)

Grid Vulnerability**. DOD is unable to provide its ¶ bases with electricity when the civilian electrical grid is ¶ offline for an extended period of time**. Currently, **domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their ¶ electricity from the civilian power grid**. As explained in a ¶ recent study from the Defense Science Board:¶ DOD’s key problem with electricity is **that critical ¶ missions, such as national strategic awareness and ¶ national command authorities, are almost entirely ¶ dependent on the national transmission grid** . . . ¶ **[which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity ¶ limit, and outside of DOD control**. In most cases, ¶ **neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides¶ sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical ¶ national priority functions and oversight of ¶ strategic missions in the face of** a long term (several ¶ months) **outage**.¶ 7¶ The grid’s fragility was demonstrated during the 2003 ¶ Northeast blackout in which 50 million people in the ¶ United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a ¶ week, when one Ohio utility failed to properly trim trees. ¶ The blackout created cascading disruptions in sewage ¶ systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, ¶ border check systems, and so forth, and demonstrated the ¶ interdependence of modern infrastructural systems.¶ 8¶ More recently, awareness has been growing that ¶ **the grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks**. A report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security suggests **that a coordinated cyberattack on the grid ¶ could result in a third of the country losing power for ¶ a period of weeks or months**.¶ 9¶ Cyberattacks on critical ¶ infrastructure are not well understood. It is not clear, for ¶ instance, whether existing terrorist groups might be able ¶ to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. **It ¶ is likely, however, that some nation-states either have or ¶ are working on developing the ability to take down the ¶ U.S. grid**. **In the event of a war** with one of these states, ¶ it is possible, if not likely, that **parts of the civilian grid ¶ would cease to function, taking with them military bases ¶ located in affected regions.**¶ Government and private organizations are currently ¶ working to secure the grid against attacks; however, it is ¶ not clear that they will be successful. Most military bases ¶ currently have backup power that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their ¶ own. If power were not restored after this amount of time, ¶ the results could be disastrous. First, military assets taken ¶ offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief. Second, **during an extended blackout, global ¶ military operations could be seriously compromised; this ¶ disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout ¶ was induced during major combat operations.** During the ¶ Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that blinding an opponent with a grid blackout could escalate to nuclear war. America’s current opponents, however, may not share this fear or be deterred ¶ by this possibility.¶ In 2008, the Defense Science Board stressed that ¶ DOD should mitigate the electrical grid’s vulnerabilities by turning military installations into “islands” of ¶ energy self-sufficiency.¶ 10¶ **The department has made efforts to do so by promoting efficiency programs** that ¶ lower power consumption on bases and by constructing ¶ renewable power generation facilities on selected bases. ¶ **Unfortunately, these programs will not come close to ¶ reaching the goal of islanding the vast majority of bases. ¶ Even with massive investment in efficiency and renewables, most bases would not be able to function for more ¶ than a few days after the civilian grid went offline**. **Unlike other alternative sources of energy, small reactors have the potential to solve DOD’s vulnerability to ¶ grid outages.** **Most bases have relatively light power demands when compared to civilian towns or cities. Small ¶ reactors could easily support bases’ power demands separate from the civilian grid during crises**. In some cases, ¶ the reactors could be designed to produce enough power ¶ not only to supply the base, but also to provide critical ¶ services in surrounding towns during long-term outages.¶ Strategically, islanding bases with small reactors ¶ has another benefit. **One of the main reasons an enemy ¶ might be willing to risk reprisals by taking down the ¶ U.S. grid during a period of military hostilities would ¶ be to affect ongoing military operations. Without the ¶ lifeline of intelligence, communication, and logistics ¶ provided by U.S. domestic bases, American military operations would be compromised in almost any conceivable contingency. Making bases more resilient to ¶ civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for ¶ an opponent to attack the grid.** An opponent might ¶ still attempt to take down the grid for the sake of disrupting civilian systems, but **the powerful incentive to ¶ do so in order to win an ongoing battle or war would ¶ be greatly reduced.**

**Cyber-attack is coming ---actors are probing grid weaknesses**

**Reed ‘12**

John, Reports on the frontiers of cyber war and the latest in military technology for Killer Apps at Foreign Policy, "U.S. energy companies victims of potentially destructive cyber intrusions", 10/11, killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/11/us\_energy\_companies\_victims\_of\_potentially\_destructive\_cyber\_attacks

**Foreign actors are probing** the **networks** of key American companies **in an attempt to gain control of industrial facilities and transportation systems**, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta revealed tonight.¶ "We know that foreign **cyber actors are probing America's critical infrastructure networks**," said Panetta, disclosing previously classified information during a speech in New York laying out the Pentagon's role in protecting the U.S. from cyber attacks. "**They are targeting the computer control systems that operate** chemical, **electricity** and water plants, and those that guide transportation thorough the country."¶ He went on to say that **the U.S. government knows of "specific instances where intruders have gained access" to these systems** -- frequently known as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (or SCADA) systems -- **and that "they are seeking to create advanced tools to attack these systems and cause panic, destruction and even the loss of life**," according to an advance copy of his prepared remarks.¶ The secretary said that **a coordinated attack on enough critical infrastructure could be a "cyber Pearl Harbor" that would "cause physical destruction and loss of life, paralyze and shock the nation, and create a profound new sense of vulnerability.**"¶ While there have been reports of criminals using 'spear phishing' email attacks aimed at stealing information about American utilties, **Panetta's remarks** seemed to **suggest more sophisticated, nation-state backed attempts to actually gain control of and damage power-generating equipment**. ¶ **Panetta's comments** regarding the penetration of American utilities **echo those of a private sector cyber security expert** Killer Apps spoke with last week **who said that the networks of American electric companies were penetrated, perhaps in preparation for a Stuxnet-style attack**.¶ Stuxnet is the famous cyber weapon that infected Iran's uranium-enrichment centrifuges in 2009 and 2010. Stuxnet is believed to have caused some of the machines to spin erratically, thereby destroying them.¶ "**There is hard evidence that there has been penetration of our power companies, and given Stuxnet, that is a staging step before destruction" of electricity-generating equipment, the expert told K**iller **A**pps. Because uranium centrifuges and power turbines are both spinning machines, "**the attack is identical -- the one to take out the centrifuges and the one to take out our power systems is the same attack**."¶ "**If a centrifuge running at the wrong speed can blow apart" so can a power generator, said the expert. "If you do, in fact, spin them at the wrong speeds, you can blow up any rotating device**."¶ **Cyber security expert** Eugene **Kaspersky said two weeks ago that one of his greatest fears is someone reverse-engineering a sophisticated cyber weapon like Stuxnet -- a relatively easy task** -- and he noted that Stuxnet itself passed through power plants on its way to Iran. "Stuxnet infected thousands of computer systems all around the globe, I know there were power plants infected by Stuxnet very far away from Iran," Kaspersky said.

#### Grid attacks take out C and C---causes retaliation and nuclear war

Tilford ‘12

Robert, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, “Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast” 2012, <http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa>

To make matters worse **a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple the U.S. military.**¶ The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power “every military base in our country.”¶ “Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with **backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out”**, he said.¶ Which means military **command and control centers could go dark**.¶ **Radar systems that detect air threats** to our country **would shut Down completely**.¶ “**Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power”,** said Senator Grassley.¶ “**So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions**”, he said.¶ We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real.¶ Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, **the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country”** (source: Congressional Record).¶ So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this?¶ Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure (see video: Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\_kVQrp\_D0kY&feature=relmfu ).¶ **A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met with a “full scale” US military response.**¶ That could include the use **of “nuclear weapons**”, if authorized by the President.

#### Grid failure wrecks US critical mission operations, kills Heg

Stockton 11

Paul, assistant secretary of defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, “Ten Years After 9/11: Challenges for the Decade to Come”, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=7.2.11>

The cyber threat to the DIB is only part of a much larger challenge to DoD. Potential **adversaries are seeking asymmetric means to cripple our force projection, warfighting, and sustainment capabilities, by targeting the critical civilian and defense supporting assets** (within the United States and abroad) on which our forces depend. This challenge is not limited to man-made threats; DoD must also execute its mission-essential functions in the face of disruptions caused by naturally occurring hazards.20 **Threats and hazards to DoD mission execution include incidents such as earthquakes, naturally occurring pandemics, solar weather events, and industrial accidents**, as well as kinetic or virtual attacks by state or non-state actors. **Threats can also emanate from insiders with ties to foreign counterintelligence organizations, homegrown terrorists, or individuals** with a malicious agenda. From a DoD perspective, this global convergence of unprecedented threats and hazards, and vulnerabilities and consequences, is a particularly problematic reality of the post-Cold War world. Successfully deploying and sustaining our military forces are increasingly a function of interdependent supply chains and privately owned infrastructure within the United States and abroad, including transportation networks, cyber systems, commercial corridors, communications pathways, and energy grids. This infrastructure largely falls outside DoD direct control. Adversary **actions to destroy, disrupt, or manipulate this highly vulnerable homeland- and foreign-based infrastructure may be relatively easy** to achieve and extremely tough to counter. Attacking such “**soft,” diffuse infrastructure systems could significantly affect our military forces globally – potentially blinding them, neutering their command and control, degrading their mobility, and isolating them from their principal sources of logistics support**. The Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) under Mission Assurance seeks to improve execution of DoD assigned missions to make them more resilient. This is accomplished through the assessment of the supporting commercial infrastructure relied upon by key nodes during execution. By building resilience into the system and ensuring this support is well maintained, DoD aims to ensure it can "take a punch as well as deliver one."21 It also provides the department the means to prioritize investments across all DoD components and assigned missions to the most critical issues faced by the department through the use of risk decision packages (RDP).22 The commercial power supply on which DoD depends exemplifies both the novel challenges we face and the great progress we are making with other federal agencies and the private sector. Today’s commercial electric power grid has a great deal of resilience against the sort of disruptive events that have traditionally been factored into the grid’s design. Yet, the grid will increasingly confront threats beyond that traditional design basis. **This complex risk environment includes:** disruptive or deliberate attacks, either physical or cyber in nature; severe natural hazards such as geomagnetic storms and natural disasters with cascading regional and national impacts (as in NLE 11); long supply chain lead times for key replacement electric power equipment; transition to **automated control systems and other smart grid** technologies without robust security; and more frequent interruptions in fuel supplies to electricity-generating plants. **These risks are magnified by globalization, urbanization, and the highly interconnected nature of people, economies, information, and infrastructure systems.** The department is highly dependent on commercial power grids and energy sources. As the largest consumer of energy in the United States, DoD is dependent on commercial electricity sources outside its ownership and control for secure, uninterrupted power to support critical missions. In fact, approximately 99 percent of the electricity consumed by DoD facilities originates offsite, while approximately 85 percent of critical electricity infrastructure itself is commercially owned. This situation only underscores the importance of our partnership with DHS and its work to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure – a mission that serves not only the national defense but also the larger national purpose of sustaining our economic health and competitiveness. DoD has traditionally assumed that the commercial grid will be subject only to infrequent, weather-related, and short-term disruptions, and that available backup power is sufficient to meet critical mission needs. As noted in the February 2008 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, “**In most cases, neither the grid nor on-base backup power provides sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of** critical **national priority functions and oversight of strategic** missions **in the face of a long term** (several months) outage.”23 Similarly, a 2009 GAO Report on Actions Needed to Improve the Identification and Management of Electrical Power Risks and Vulnerabilities to DoD Critical Assets stated that DoD mission-critical assets rely primarily on commercial electric power and are vulnerable to disruptions in electric power supplies.24 **Moreover, these vulnerabilities may cascade into other critical infrastructure that uses the grid – communications, water, transportation, and pipelines – that, in turn, is needed for the normal operation of the grid, as well as its quick recovery in emergency situations.** To remedy this situation, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force recommended that DoD take a broad-based approach, including a focused analysis of critical functions and supporting assets, a more realistic assessment of electricity outage cause and duration, and an integrated approach to risk management that includes greater efficiency, renewable resources, distributed generation, and increased reliability. DoD Mission Assurance is designed to carry forward the DSB recommendations. Yet, for a variety of reasons – technical, financial, regulatory, and legal – DoD has limited ability to manage electrical power demand and supply on its installations. As noted above, DHS is the lead agency for critical infrastructure protection by law and pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7. The Department of Energy (DOE) is the lead agency on energy matters. And within DoD, energy and energy security roles and responsibilities are distributed and shared, with different entities managing security against physical, nuclear, and cyber threats; cost and regulatory compliance; and the response to natural disasters. And of course, production and delivery of electric power to most DoD installations are controlled by commercial entities that are regulated by state and local utility commissions. The resulting paradox: DoD is dependent on a commercial power system over which it does not – and never will – exercise control.

#### Hegemony prevents extinction

Barnett 11

(Thomas P.M., Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7 <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>)

**Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans** that we **stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower**. **Unfortunately**, **we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility**. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: **We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured**, **with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its** relative and absolute **lack of mass violence**. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization**, **the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known**. **Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century**, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation.**  But **the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war**. **Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace**. **We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy**, the **persistent spread of human rights**, the liberation of women, **the doubling of life expectancy**, a roughly **10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP** **and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.** That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms**, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

### Advantage two is China

#### Global SMR development’s inevitable – only a question of whether the US leads

Hiruo 10
(Elaine, Managing Editor of Platts, "SMR technology gives US chance at market leadership, vendors say," 9-2-10, Lexis)

**The US** **nuclear industry lost its leadership** position **in the global market for large reactors and now has the opportunity to secure that role for s**mall **m**odular **r**eactor**s,** some SMR vendors told a subcommittee of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future August 30.¶ But they stressed their **companies will need the federal government's help to beat foreign competitors to the market.**¶ **"We're at a unique crossroads right now**," Christofer Mowry, president of Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Energy, told the reactor and fuel cycle technology subcommittee during its two-day meeting in Washington. B&W is one of several US companies — including Hyperion Power Generation, NuScale and Westinghouse — developing an SMR design.¶ "Other countries want a technology that has been built in the host country first," Paul Lorenzini, CEO of NuScale, told the panel. "**There are lots of** small reactor **designs out there,**" he said. Both the Koreans and Japanese have SMR programs, according to industry executives on the speakers panel. **The question is**, Mowry said, **who enters the** global **market first with a reactor already operating on its home turf.**

#### Obama pushing SMRs now but its not enough to beat out China

Ervin 12/28

[Dan Ervin is a professor of finance at Salisbury University. <http://www.delmarvanow.com/article/20121230/OPINION03/312300005> ETB]

The Obama administration’s decision to kick-start commercial use of small modular reactors has made one thing clear: The notion that nuclear power is slipping away is wrong. Although nuclear power faces difficult challenges, industry and government are working together to forge a new path.¶ The Department of Energy has earmarked funds for a new public-private partnership to help develop innovative small reactors that are about one-third the size of those in large conventional nuclear plants. These small reactors are modular, meaning they will be built in factories before they are shipped and installed at nuclear sites. This production method has the potential to reduce the cost of nuclear power significantly.¶ Southern Co. has begun building two new nuclear plants in Georgia using new construction techniques that could convince other companies nuclear plants are easier to build than otherwise thought.¶ Congress is planning to take up comprehensive legislation on nuclear waste next year using a “consent-based approach” to finding a site for a deep-geologic repository or an interim storage facility. Both would hold high-level waste and used fuel. Such an approach was recommended earlier in the year by a high-level blue-ribbon commission.¶ With respect to nuclear safety, American companies are adopting lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan.¶ US industry is playing an active role in the global market for nuclear technology, where as much as $740 billion in business is at stake over the next decade. With 104 reactors, America still leads the world in installed nuclear capacity. This represents about 30 percent of global nuclear generation. Congress needs to authorize funds for projects to demonstrate the feasibility of small modular reactors.¶ Global electricity requirements are projected to grow by an estimated 80 percent by 2030.¶ Nuclear power remains the only proven technology capable of reliably providing zero-carbon energy on a scale that can have a meaningful impact on global warming.¶ A serious threat to the future of American nuclear power is the shortage of government research and development funds for advanced nuclear technologies. Other countries, notably China, are devoting a larger share of their energy funding to nuclear research on fast reactors and other designs that are inherently safe and produce little or no waste. The US needs to do the same.

#### Delaying commercialization allows China to solidify their lead

Wheeler 12
(Brian, editor of Power Engineering magazine, "Developing Small Modular Reactor Designs in the U.S," 4-1-12, <http://www.power-eng.com/articles/npi/print/volume-5/issue-2/nucleus/developing-small-modular-reactor-designs-in-the-us.html>)

The development of small modular reactors in the U.S. continues to gain support as the country searches for clean energy options. Although concepts are still being designed, **the U.S. D**epartment **o**f **E**nergy **gave the sector a boost** in March **when it released** **a** Funding Opportunity Announcement to establish **cost-shared agreements** **to support the design and licensing of SMRs.** A total of $450 million will be made available to support two SMRs over five years.¶ "America's choice is clear," said Energy Secretary Steven Chu. "We can either develop the next generation of clean energy technologies, which will help create thousands of jobs and export opportunities here in America, or we can wait for other countries to take the lead."¶ The Energy Department said SMRs are about one-third the size of current nuclear power plants and are designed to offer a host of safety, siting, construction and economic benefits. The size, according to DOE, makes SMRs ideal for small electric grids and locations that cannot support large reactors. Also, the reduced cost due to factory production may make the SMR more attractive to utilities seeking to add a smaller amount of power.¶ "We really see a market right now that includes utilities that don't have a large financial base and that are interested in clean, sustainable power. They are looking at the SMR as an investment of a billion dollars versus several billion dollars for large nuclear," said John Goossen, vice president of Innovation and SMR Development at Westinghouse. "These utilities, in most cases, do not need large chunks of power and are looking to add power incrementally as part of their plans for growth." In February, the Electric Power Research Institute and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory released a study that stated the U.S. has the potential to generate 201 GW from SMRs. For their study, a small modular reactor was labeled as 350 MWe or less. The DOE defines an SMR as 300 MWe or less. The study stated that "350 MWe was considered a reasonable bounding estimate of an initial SMR installation."¶ **The U.S. is leading the world in the amount of SMR designs, but China could be the first country to have a SMR design operational.** Launched in 2011, **a** 200 MWe HTR-PM **reactor is under construction with the support of China Huaneng Group, China Nuclear Engineering and Construction, and Tsinghua University's INET,** according to the World Nuclear Association.¶ "**The U.S. needs to move faster if we are going to compete with the** South Koreans, the **Chinese** and the Russians," said Bob Prince, vice chairman and CEO, Gen4 Energy.

**Using the DOD as a first mover leads to rapid commercialization and allows the US to out-compete other countries**

Loudermilk ‘11

(Micah J. Loudermilk is a Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, May 31, 2011, “Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs,” Journal of Energy Security, <http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375>)

Path forward: Department of Defense as first-mover¶ Problematically, **despite the immense energy security benefits that would accompany the wide-scale adoption of small modular reactors in the US, with a difficult regulatory environment, anti-nuclear lobbying groups, skeptical public opinion, and** of course the recent **Fukushima** accident, **the nuclear industry faces a tough road in the battle for new reactors.** While President Obama and Energy Secretary Chu have demonstrated support for nuclear advancement on the SMR front, progress will prove difficult. However, **a potential route exists by which small reactors may more easily become a reality: the US military.**¶ The US Navy has successfully managed, without accident, over 500 small reactors on-board its ships and submarines throughout 50 years of nuclear operations. At the same time, serious concern exists, highlighted by the Defense Science Board Task Force in 2008, that US military bases are tied to, and almost entirely dependent upon, the fragile civilian electrical grid for 99% of its electricity consumption. To protect military bases’ power supplies and the nation’s military assets housed on these domestic installations, the Board recommended a strategy of “islanding” the energy supplies for military installations, thus ensuring their security and availability in a crisis or conflict that disrupts the nation’s grid or energy supplies.¶ DOD has sought to achieve this through decreased energy consumption and renewable technologies placed on bases, but these endeavors will not go nearly far enough in achieving the department’s objectives. However, **by placing small reactors on domestic US military bases, DOD could solve its own energy security quandary**—providing assured supplies of secure and constant energy both to bases and possibly the surrounding civilian areas as well. **Concerns over reactor safety and security are alleviated by the security already present on installations and the military’s long history of successfully operating nuclear reactors without incident.**¶ Unlike reactors on-board ships, **small reactors housed on domestic bases would undoubtedly be subject to Nuclear Regulatory Commission** (NRC) **regulation and certification, however, with strong military backing, adoption of the reactors may prove significantly easier than would otherwise be possible.** Additionally, as the reactors become integrated on military facilities, general fears over the use and expansion of nuclear power will ease, creating inroads for widespread adoption of the technology at the private utility level. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, **action by DOD as a “first mover” on small reactor technology will preserve America’s badly struggling and nearly extinct nuclear energy industry. The US** possesses a wealth of knowledge and technological expertise on SMRs and **has an opportunity to take a leading role in its adoption worldwide. With the domestic nuclear industry largely dormant** for three decades, **the US is at risk of losing its position as the global leader in the international nuclear energy market. If the current trend continues, the US will reach a point in the future where it is forced to import nuclear technologies from other countries**—a point echoed by Secretary Chu in his push for nuclear power expansion. **Action by the military to install reactors on domestic bases will guarantee the short-term survival of the US nuclear industry and will work to solidify long-term support for nuclear energy.**¶ Conclusions¶ In the end, small modular reactors present a viable path forward for both the expansion of nuclear power in the US and also for enhanced US energy security. Offering highly safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant designs, SMRs have the potential to bring carbon-free baseload distributed power across the United States. Small reactors measure up with, and even exceed, large nuclear reactors on questions of safety and possibly on the financial (cost) front as well. SMRs carry many of the benefits of both large-scale nuclear energy generation and renewable energy technologies. At the same time, they can reduce US dependence on fossil fuels for electricity production—moving the US ahead on carbon dioxide and GHG reduction goals and setting a global example. While domestic hurdles within the nuclear regulatory environment domestically have proven nearly impossible to overcome since Three Mile Island, **military adoption of small reactors on its bases would provide energy security for the nation’s military forces and may create the inroads necessary to advance the technology broadly and eventually lead to their wide-scale adoption.**

#### SMR commercialization key to nuclear leadership - recovers leadership lost to China

Rosner and Goldberg 11

(Robert Rosner, astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. He was the director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009, Stephen Goldberg, Special Assistant to the Director, Argonne National Laboratory ¶ Senior Fellow, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago¶ Research Coordinator, Global Nuclear Future Initiative ¶ American Academy of Arts and Sciences, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power ¶ Generation in the U.S.” Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, <http://csis.org/files/attachments/111129_SMR_White_Paper.pdf>, SEH)

As stated earlier, SMRs have the potential to achieve significant greenhouse gas emission¶ reductions. They could provide alternative baseload power generation to facilitate the retirement¶ of older, smaller, and less efficient coal generation plants that would, otherwise, not be good¶ candidates for retrofitting carbon capture and storage technology. They could be deployed in¶ regions of the U.S. and the world that have less potential for other forms of carbon-free¶ electricity, such as solar or wind energy. There may be technical or market constraints, such as¶ projected electricity demand growth and transmission capacity, which would support SMR¶ deployment but not GW-scale LWRs. From the on-shore manufacturing perspective, a key point¶ is that the manufacturing base needed for SMRs can be developed domestically. Thus, while the¶ large commercial LWR industry is seeking to transplant portions of its supply chain from current¶ foreign sources to the U.S., **the SMR industry offers the potential to establish a large domestic¶ manufacturing base building upon already existing U.S. manufacturing infrastructure and¶ capability,** **including the Naval shipbuilding and underutilized domestic nuclear component and¶ equipment plants**. The study team learned that a number of sustainable domestic jobs could be¶ created – that is, the full panoply of design, manufacturing, supplier, and construction activities –¶ if the U.S. can establish itself as a credible and substantial designer and manufacturer of SMRs.¶ While many SMR technologies are being studied around the world, a **strong U.S.¶ commercialization** program **can enable U.S. industry to be first to market SMRs,** thereby **serving¶ as a fulcrum for** export growth as well as a lever in **influencing international decisions on¶ deploying both** nuclear **reactor and** nuclear **fuel cycle tech**nology. **A** viable **U.S.-centric SMR¶ industry would** enablethe U.S. to **recapture** technological **leadership in** commercial **nuclear¶ tech**nology, **which has been lost to** suppliers in France, Japan, Korea, Russia, and, now rapidly¶ emerging, **China**.

**Ceding nuclear leadership to China leads to unchecked Chinese agression in Asia – kills US regional leadership**

**Cullinane ‘11**

[Scott Cullinane is a graduate student at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C <http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=319:america-falling-behind-the-strategic-dimensions-of-chinese-commercial-nuclear-energy&catid=118:content&Itemid=376> ETB]

Due to a confluence of events the United States has recently focused more attention on nuclear weapons policy than it has in previous years; however, the proliferation of commercial nuclear technology and its implications for America’s strategic position have been largely ignored. While the Unites States is currently a participant in the international commercial nuclear energy trade, **America’s** own **domestic construction of nuclear power plants has atrophied severely and the US risks losing its competitive edge in** the **nuclear energy** arena.¶ Simultaneously, the People’s Republic of **China** (PRC) **has made great strides in closing the nuclear** energy **development gap with America**. **Through a combination of importing technology, research from within China itself, and a disciplined policy approach the PRC is increasingly able to leverage the export of commercial nuclear power as part of its national strategy**. **Disturbingly, China does not share America’s commitment to stability, transparency, and responsibility when exporting nuclear technology**. This is a growing strategic weakness and risk for the United States**. To remain competitive and to be in a position to offset the PRC when required the American government should encourage** the **domestic** use of **nuclear power and spur** the forces of **tech**nological **innovation**.¶ History has recorded well American wartime nuclear developments which culminated in the July 1945 Trinity Test, but what happened near Arco, Idaho six years later has been overlooked. In 1951, scientists for the first time produced usable electricity from an experimental nuclear reactor. Once this barrier was conquered the atom was harnessed to generate electricity and permitted America to move into the field of commercial nuclear power. In the next five years alone the United States signed over 20 nuclear cooperation agreements with various countries. Not only did the US build dozens of power plants domestically during the 1960s and 1970s, the US Export-Import Bank also distributed $7.1 billion dollars in loans and guarantees for the international sale of 49 reactors. American built and designed reactors were exported around the world during those years. Even today, more than 60% of the world’s 440 operating reactors are based on technology developed in the United States. The growth of the US civilian nuclear power sector stagnated after the Three Mile Island incident in 1979 – the most serious accident in American civilian nuclear power history. Three Mile Island shook America’s confidence in nuclear power and provided the anti-nuclear lobby ample fuel to oppose the further construction of any nuclear power plants. In the following decade, 42 planned domestic nuclear power plants were cancelled, and in the 30 years since the Three Mile Island incident the American nuclear power industry has survived only through foreign sales and merging operations with companies in Asia and Europe. Westinghouse sold its nuclear division to Toshiba and General Electric joined with Hitachi. Even the highest levels of the American government came to cast nuclear power aside. President Bill Clinton bragged in his 1993 State of the Union Address that “we are eliminating programs that are no longer needed, such as nuclear power research and development.” ¶ **America’s slow pace of reactor construction over the past three decades has stymied innovation and caused the nuclear sector and its industrial base to shrivel**. While some aspects of America’s nuclear infrastructure still operate effectively, **many critical areas have atrophied.** For example, one capability that America has entirely lost is the means to cast ultra heavy forgings in the range of 350,000 – 600,000 pounds, which impacts the construction of containment vessels, turbine rotors, and steam generators. In contrast, Japan, China, and Russia all possess an ultra heavy forging capacity and South Korea and India plan to build forges in this range. Likewise, the dominance America enjoyed in uranium enrichment until the 1970s is gone. The current standard centrifuge method for uranium enrichment was not invented in America and today 40% of the enriched uranium US power plants use is processed overseas and imported. Another measure of how much the US nuclear industry has shrunk is evident in the number of companies certified to handle nuclear material. In the 1980s the United States had 400 nuclear suppliers and 900 holders of N-stamp certificates (N-stamps are the international nuclear rating certificates issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers). By 2008 that number had reduced itself to 80 suppliers and 200 N-stamp holders. A recent Government Accountability Office report, which examined data from between 1994 and 2009, found the US to have a declining share of the global commercial nuclear trade. However, during that same period over 60 reactors were built worldwide. Nuclear power plants are being built in the world increasingly by non-American companies.¶ The American nuclear industry entered the 1960s in a strong position, yet over the past 30 years other countries have closed the development gap with America. **The implications of this change go beyond economics or prestige to include national security. These changes would be less threatening if friendly allies were the ones moving forward with developing a nuclear export industry; however, the quick advancement of the PRC in nuclear energy changes the strategic calculus for America.**¶ The shifting strategic landscape¶ **While America’s nuclear industry has languished, current changes in the world’s strategic layout no longer allow America the option of maintaining the status quo without being surpassed.** The drive for research, development, and scientific progress that grew out of the Cold War propelled America forward, but those priorities have long since been downgraded by the US government. **The economic development of formerly impoverished countries means that the US cannot assume continued dominance by default**. **The rapidly industrializing PRC is seeking its own place among the major powers of the world and is vying for hegemony in Asia; nuclear power is an example of their larger efforts to marshal their scientific and economic forces as instruments of national power.**¶ The rise of China is a phrase that connotes images of a backwards country getting rich off of exporting cheap goods at great social and environmental costs. Yet, this understanding of the PRC has lead many in the United States to underestimate China’s capabilities. The Communist Party of China (**CPC) has undertaken a comprehensive long-term strategy to transition from a weak state that lags behind the West to a country that is a peer-competitor to the United States. Nuclear technology provides a clear example of this.** ¶ In 1978, General Secretary Deng Xiaoping began to move China out of the destructive Mao era with his policies of 'reform and opening.' As part of these changes during the 1980s, the CPC began a concerted and ongoing effort to modernize the PRC and acquire advanced technology including nuclear technology from abroad. This effort was named Program 863 and included both legal methods and espionage. By doing this, the PRC has managed to rapidly catch up to the West on some fronts. In order to eventually surpass the West in scientific development the PRC launched the follow-on Program 973 to build the foundations of basic scientific research within China to meet the nation’s major strategic needs. These steps have brought China to the cusp of the next stage of technological development, a stage known as “indigenous innovation.”¶ ¶ In 2006 the PRC published their science and technology plan out to 2020 and defined indigenous innovation as enhancing original innovation, integrated innovation, and re-innovation based on assimilation and absorption of imported technology in order improve national innovation capability. The Chinese seek to internalize and understand technological developments from around the world so that they can copy the equipment and use it as a point to build off in their own research. This is a step beyond merely copying and reverse engineering a piece of technology. The PRC sees this process of absorbing foreign technology coupled with indigenous innovation as a way of leapfrogging forward in development to gain the upper hand over the West. **The PRC’s official statement on energy policy lists nuclear power as one of their target fields. When viewed within this context, the full range of implications from China’s development of nuclear technology becomes evident**. **The PRC is** now **competing with the U**nited **St**ates **in the areas of innovation and high-technology, two fields that have driven American power since World War Two**. **China’s economic appeal** is no longer merely the fact that it has cheap labor, but **is expanding its economic power in a purposeful way that directly challenges America’s position in the world**.¶ ¶ **The CPC uses the market to their advantage to attract nuclear technology and intellectual capital to China**. The PRC has incentivized the process and encouraged new domestic nuclear power plant construction with the goal of having 20 nuclear power plants operational by 2020. The Chinese Ministry of Electrical Power has described PRC policy to reach this goal as encouraging joint investment between State Owned Corporations and foreign companies. 13 reactors are already operating in China, 25 more are under construction and even more reactors are in the planning stages. ¶ In line with this economic policy, China has bought nuclear reactors from Westinghouse and Areva and is cooperating with a Russian company to build nuclear power plants in Taiwan. By stipulating that Chinese companies and personnel be involved in the construction process, China is building up its own domestic capabilities and expects to become self-sufficient. **China’s** State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation has **partnered with Westinghouse to build a new and larger reactor** based on the existing Westinghouse AP 1000 reactor. **This will give the PRC a reactor design of its own to then export**. **If the CPC is able to combine their control over raw materials, growing technical know-how, and manufacturing base, China will not only be a powerful economy, but be able to leverage this power to service its foreign policy goals as well.**¶ Even though the PRC is still working to master third generation technology, their scientists are already working on what they think will be the nuclear reactor of the future. China is developing Fourth Generation Fast Neutron Reactors and wants to have one operational by 2030. Additionally, a Chinese nuclear development company has announced its intentions to build the “world’s first high-temperature, gas-cooled reactor” in Shandong province which offers to possibility of a reactor that is nearly meltdown proof. A design, which if proved successful, could potentially redefine the commercial nuclear energy trade.¶ The risk to America¶ **The international trade of nuclear material is hazardous in that every sale and transfer increases the chances for an accident or for willful misuse of the material. Nuclear commerce must be kept safe in order for the benefits of nuclear power generation to be realized. Yet, China has a record of sharing dangerous weapons and nuclear material with unfit countries**. **It is a risk for America to allow China to become a nuclear exporting country with a competitive technical and scientific edge. In order to limit Chinese influence and the relative attractiveness of what they can offer, America must ensure its continuing and substantive lead in reactor technology.**¶ ¶ The PRC’s record of exporting risky items is well documented. It is known that during the 1980s **the Chinese shared nuclear weapon designs with Pakistan and continues to proliferate WMD-related material.** According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to Congress, **China sells technologies and components in the Middle East and South Asia that are dual use and could support WMD and missile programs.** Jane’s Intelligence Review reported in 2006 that China,¶ Despite a 1997 promise to Washington to halt its nuclear technology sales to Iran, such assistance is likely to continue. In 2005, Iranian resistance groups accused China of selling Iran beryllium, which is useful for making nuclear triggers and maraging steel (twice as hard as stainless steel), which is critical for fabricating centrifuges needed to reprocess uranium into bomb-grade material. ¶ **China sells dangerous materials in order to secure its geopolitical objectives, regardless if those actions harm world stability. There is little reason to believe China will treat the sale of nuclear reactors any differently. Even if the PRC provides public assurances that it will behave differently in the future, the CPC has not been truthful for decades about its nuclear material and weapons sales and hence lacks credibility**. For example, in 1983 Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng said that China does not encourage or support nuclear proliferation. In fact, it was that same year that China contracted with Algeria, then a non-NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] state, to construct a large, unsafeguarded plutonium production reactor. In 1991 a Chinese Embassy official wrote in a letter to the The Washington Post that 'China has struck no nuclear deal with Iran.' In reality, China had provided Iran with a research reactor capable of producing plutonium and a calutron, a technology that can be used to enrich uranium to weapons-grade. It has been reported that even after United Nation sanctions were put on Iran, Chinese companies were discovered selling “high-quality carbon fiber” and “pressure gauges” to Iran for use in improving their centrifuges.¶ In 2004 the PRC joined the Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG), gaining international recognition of their growing power in the nuclear field. In spite of this opportunity for China to demonstrate its responsibility with nuclear energy, it has not fulfilled it NSG obligations. The PRC has kept the terms of its nuclear reactor sale to Pakistan secret and used a questionable legal technicality to justify forgoing obtaining a NSG waiver for the deal. Additionally, China chose to forgo incorporating new safety measures into the reactors in order to avoid possible complications.¶

**U.S. leadership in Asia checks escalation in multiple hostpots**

**Goh 8**

(Evelyn, Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the Univ of Oxford, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, “Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order,” 2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford Journals Database)

This is the main structural dilemma: **as long as the U**nited **S**tates **does not give up its primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy**, China is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet**, the East Asian regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony**, and **to change that could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly destabilizing ways**. **Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions**. 5 Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia’s evolving security order, I have suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional stability and order. **The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy**, **with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order**. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However, **the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy**, a contest made more potent because of the intertwining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States’ global leadership and regional domination. **At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan**. Recent history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from **US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt**, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one factor that Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order 373lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. **The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.**

**Those go nuclear**

**Landy 2k**

 National Security Expert @ Knight Ridder, 3/10 ¶ (Jonathan, Knight Ridder, lexis)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But **even a minor miscalculation** by any of them **could destabilize Asia,** jolt the global economy **and** even **start** a **nuclear war. India, Pakistan and** **China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea** may have a few, **too. Asia lacks the** kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic **relationships that helped keep** an uneasy **peace** for five decades **in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else** on Earth **are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,”** said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. **There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia** committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and **the U**nited **St**ates **would instantly** **become embroiled** if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either **India or Pakistan**, a conflict between the two **could end the** global **taboo against using nuclear weapons** and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia \_ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources \_ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

#### China will assert leadership in the South China Sea

Hung December ‘12

[Nguyen Manh Hung is associate professor of government and international politics, and faculty associate of the Center of Global Studies, George Mason University. <http://www.globalasia.org/V7N4_Winter_2012/Nguyen_Manh_Hung.html> ETB]¶

|  |
| --- |
| By 2009-2010, the heightened tension between China and the ASEAN claimants over the contested islands led to an internationalization of the conflict, with the US and other powers beginning to express a view on the disputes. That’s understandable, given that the South China Sea is the world’s second-busiest sea-lane, with more than half of the world’s super tankers and $5.3 trillion in annual trade passing through the area (US trade alone accounts for $1.2 trillion of that figure). The concern over China’s claims and assertive behavior, coupled with China’s lack of transparency in its military modernization program, have created an arms race in Southeast Asia and elicited strong reactions from major powers worried about the situation. India and Japan, for their part, are also concerned over freedom of navigation. Both countries have advocated peaceful resolution of the disputes, but have also increased their diplomatic, economic and naval presence in the area. The US, meanwhile, is in the midst of a policy pivot to the Asia-Pacific, committing 60 percent of its naval assets to the Pacific Ocean, and taking actions to strengthen and modernize “historic alliances” with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand, as well as building “robust partnerships” throughout the region.4 Russia has also begun to voice its concern over the issue of freedom of navigation and “outside meddling” in the South China Sea. In May 2009, as the deadline for claims based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) approached, China was forced to put its cards on the table and Beijing officially presented its nine-dashed-line map, claiming control over 80 percent of the South China Sea and encroaching on territories claimed by other Southeast Asian countries. Almost immediately, the US Senate held a hearing on the South China Sea and in June unanimously passed a resolution “deploring China’s use of force in the South China Sea and supporting the continuation of operations by US armed forces in support of freedom of navigation rights in international water and air space in the South China Sea.” In June 2010, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, heated exchanges over the South China Sea took place between China and the US, joined by other ASEAN countries. A month earlier, at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue between the US and China in Beijing, Chinese officials, in a move viewed as raising the stakes in the conflict, declared the country’s claims in the South China Sea to be a “core interest.”5 Influential elites in China view the South China Sea as “blue territory” — that is, as much a part of China’s sovereign territory as Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan.6 The US response came in the form of a speech by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July, in which she made it clear that “The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” Significantly, American and Chinese understandings of “freedom of navigation” differ. The US believes it includes the right to conduct military exercises and collect intelligence and militarily useful data, while China wants foreign naval ships and aircraft to seek China’s permission before entering its “internal waters” in the South China Sea.7 Since conflicts of national interests between major world powers can easily lead to friction and war, the escalating tensions between China and the US over these maritime disputes should be a serious cause for concern. The Systemic Conflict From a systemic perspective, the US-China conflict over the South China Sea may be seen as conflict between a rising power and a status quo power. For decades the US, through its Seventh Fleet and its Pacific Command, was the undisputed naval power in the Pacific. The American defeat in Vietnam in the 1970s and its later involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have changed the situation. While the US reduced its military presence in Asia and got bogged down in two costly and draining wars, China’s economy was growing and its military modernization program was gaining momentum; Beijing, as a result, has become a dominant regional power economically, politically and militarily. Chinese leaders departed from Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum to “hide your intention, bide for time,” and began to flex China’s muscles, particularly over the South China Sea. China’s assertion of its “historical right” to claim the sea is weak and doesn’t conform to either UNCLOS or customary international law. What China has been doing represents nothing less than an attempt to rewrite international law and impose its will on the region, shape global political realities and influence the “rules of the road” for the international order.8 The US, in both words and deeds, has signaled that it does not accept this. It has strengthened its military presence in Asia, revitalized its strategic relations with old allies and helped improve the defense capabilities of small countries in the region. In July 2012, when China created a prefectural-level city at Sansha, a small island in the South China Sea, and established a military garrison there to “exercise sovereignty over all land features inside the South China Sea,” the US State Department reacted by publicly denouncing China’s action as “counter to collaborative diplomatic efforts to resolve differences and risks further escalating tensions in the region,” while Congressman Howard Berman, a leading member of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, confirmed that the administration of US President Barack Obama had “repeatedly made clear to Beijing that the US will not allow China to assert hegemony over the region.”9 Conflicts of interests between rising powers and status quo powers have in the past accelerated arms races and led to war. The key questions are, can such a collision course be altered, and can the core conflicts between the two powers be resolved? **Possible End Games** There are a number of possible scenarios for resolving the South China Sea disputes. The first is that China moderates its excessive claims and strikes a deal with other coastal nations, with third-party arbitration or adjudication if necessary, based on recognized international law on territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. Before adopting its nine-dashed line, China had drawn an eleven-dashed line map, two lines of which were in the Gulf of Tonkin.10 This, however, did not prevent China and Vietnam from achieving an agreement on the demarcation of sea borders in that gulf. Moreover, Chinese officials have repeatedly denied that China has officially declared the South China Sea its “core interest,” leaving open the possibility of coming to an understanding regarding conflicting claims. Some Chinese scholars and experts working in government think tanks have privately acknowledged “the problematic nature of China’s policy in the South China Sea,” particularly with regard to “the status of the nine-dotted line.” These analysts and strategic thinkers have expressed concern that the tense situation in the South China Sea could sidetrack China’s “course of reform.”11 This leaves the door open for discussion and provides the space in which China might entertain possible concessions that would avoid embroiling China and its Southeast Asian neighbors in a long argument over China’s excessive claims. The second scenario is one in which China, taking advantage of the differential in power between it and other rival claimants, relies on a combination of unilateral actions, brinkmanship, piecemeal advances and divide-and-conquer tactics to gradually and steadily establish actual control of the sea area within the nine-dashed line. The standoff between China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal was a perfect example of how this possible scenario might unfold. The Scarborough Shoal standoff began in May 2012 when a Philippine Navy frigate was sent to investigate the area and boarded Chinese fishing boats in an area it claimed belonged to the Philippines’ EEZ. China responded by sending two unarmed China Maritime Surveillance vessels to interpose themselves between the frigate and the fishing boats and let them escape. Both sides sent in reinforcements. At the height of the standoff, there were a handful of Philippine boats facing almost 100 Chinese vessels. Faced with the overwhelming number of Chinese ships and without international support, the Philippine had to cut a deal in which both sides withdrew their ships. But after all the Philippine boats had withdrawn, China roped off the entrance to the shoal, effectively establishing its de facto control over the contested area. With that fait accompli, a new status quo in favor of China was established. This tactic of resorting to low-grade pressure to create a series of new “facts” may lead to what Toshi Yoshihara termed “strategic fatigue,” which could, in the long run, weaken resistance by rival claimants and lead to a grudging acceptance by the US of China’s claims.12 With this achieved, China would have effective control of navigation in the South China Sea and could dictate the use of that important sea-lane of communication. This approach is being resisted by ASEAN claimants and by other major powers that share the Pacific Ocean. Its success or failure will depend on two things: 1) whether China succeeds in its “divide-and-conquer” approach to ASEAN; and 2) whether ASEAN can summon the determination and capacity to act with a united front to resist China’s pressure and involve other major powers, especially the US. China’s current aggressive approach has caused friction and tension and, if unrestrained, may lead to military conflicts.13 In the long run, it will push many Asian countries closer to the US and may lead to a new kind of Cold War and containment, pitting a bloc of countries supporting the American vision of an Asian regional order against a group supporting the Chinese vision of an Asian regional order. This scenario is a nightmare for Southeast Asian countries that have worked so hard to strengthen ASEAN solidarity and promote the concept of ASEAN centrality, in order to avoid being caught up in the rivalry between the US and China. The third scenario is that China reaches an accommodation with the US, based on American recognition of China as an undisputed leader in the South China Sea, and a peaceful transition of leadership in the Asia-Pacific area from the US to China occurs. If this were to happen, it would unsettle all other Asian nations, big and small, but once the US began the accommodation process, other countries would simply have to fall in line. This process, however, would be dangerous globally and regionally. There is no guarantee, however, that if China were to dominate Asia, she would stop there. In response to the reality of a spectacularly rising China and an America burdened with economic problems and a dysfunctional government, scholars such as Adam Quinn have focused on the beginning of a power transition from the US, a declining power, to China, a rising power.14 Chinese strategic thinkers have not missed the possibility that the current contest over the South China Sea may represent the first steps toward this transition. Ding Gang, a senior editor at the Communist Party’s People’s Daily, commented: “It’s still unknown if the US plans to input equally massive manpower and financial resources as China has injected into this region. It’s very likely that the US lacks the motivation to do this in the long run. And China may become the strongest economic, political and military power in Asia.”15 The problem with this scenario is that it neglects the extent to which the two key players involved in this transition — China and the US — are regimes that represent incompatible visions of the future of the region and the world. A peaceful transition of power took place from the British Empire to the American Empire, largely because it was a case of one democracy replacing another, trading roles as the sentinels of shared regional interests. The British were willing to relinquish their dominance and were assured that, with another democracy taking the helm, its security and wellbeing were not threatened. But the clash between undemocratic revisionist powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) and democratic powers in the 1930s led to the Second World War. Regionally, this scenario would be most undesirable for smaller ASEAN countries and is unlikely to occur so long as the US has the capacity and the determination to maintain its supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region, a determination that has been strongly restated by US leaders, from the president to the secretaries of defense and state as well as by leading members of Congress.16 Aaron Friedberg points out that the ideological gap between China and the US is too great and the level of trust too low to facilitate an accommodation. He makes the case that China’s ultimate goal of regional hegemony would run counter to the US “grand strategy, which has remained constant for decades: to prevent the domination of either end of the Eurasian landmass by one or more potentially hostile powers.”17  |

#### Emerging dynamics means conflict will escalate- 6 reasons

- no cooling off periods

- New ASEAN secretary general is anti-China

- New ASEAN chair is too weak to hammer out a deal

- India getting involved

- more resources will be found

- new Chinese leadership won’t back down

Kurlantzick 12/6/12

[Joshua Kurlantzick, Fellow for Southeast Asia @ Council on Foreign Relations. <http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/12/06/south-china-sea-going-to-get-worse-before-it-might-gets-better/> ETB]

This week’s latest South China Sea incident, in which a Chinese fishing boat cut a Vietnamese seismic cable —at least according to Hanoi— is a reminder that, despite the South China Sea dominating nearly every meeting in Southeast Asia this year, the situation in the Sea appears to be getting worse. This is in contrast to flare-ups in the past, when after a period of tension, as in the mid-1990s, there was usually a cooling-off period. Although there have been several brief cooling-off periods in the past two years, including some initiated by senior Chinese leaders traveling to Southeast Asia, they have not stuck, and the situation continues to deteriorate and get more dangerous.¶ In the new year, it will likely get even worse. Here’s why:¶ The new Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) secretary-general comes from Vietnam. Over the past three years, a more openly forceful China has found it difficult to deal with ASEAN leaders who even voice ASEAN concerns. But these leaders, like former Thai foreign minister and ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, were nothing compared to the new ASEAN secretary-general, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Le Luong Minh. Although he is a career diplomat and certainly can be suave and attentive, he is still a former Vietnamese official, and undoubtedly will bring with him some of the Vietnamese perspective toward China, which is quickly turning more acrid.¶ This year’s ASEAN chair is Brunei. Keeping to its tradition of rotating the chair every year, in 2013 ASEAN will be headed by Brunei. Although some might think Brunei’s leadership will be better for stability than the 2012 ASEAN leadership of Cambodia, perceived by many other ASEAN members as carrying China’s water, the fact that Brunei is just as much of a diplomatic minnow as Cambodia will mean there is no powerful wrangler in the chair’s seat to hammer out a common ASEAN perspective. Were Indonesia or Singapore the chair, the situation might be different.¶ India is playing a larger and larger role in the South China Sea, adding even more potential players to the mix, and more powerful navies. The recent warning by Beijing that India and Vietnam should not engage in joint exploration is only going to lead to a harsher Indian response, since Indian elites pay far more attention to —and are more easily aggrieved by— China than the reverse.¶ The more they look, the more likely they will find. As reported by the New York Times, “On Monday, China’s National Energy Administration named the South China Sea as the main offshore site for natural gas production. Within two years, China aims to produce 150 billion cubic meters of natural gas from fields in the sea, a significant increase from the 20 billion cubic meters produced so far, the agency said.” Although I do not think that the oil and gas potential in the Sea is the biggest driver of conflict, compared to its strategic value, the more China (and anyone else) explores for energy in the Sea, the more likely they will (eventually) come up with potential deposits that will only raise the stakes, if the forecasts of the Sea’s petroleum potential are to be believed.¶ A new Chinese leadership is unlikely to want to show any weakness. With the leadership of this generation even more split than in the past, following a contentious Party Congress, continued infighting among acolytes of the major Chinese leaders, and the Bo Xilai fiasco, the new leadership is in no position, with Party members and the general educated public, to give any room on a contentious issue like the South China Sea.¶ The Obama administration has passed its period of focusing on more effective dialogue and crisis mediation with China. Officials from the administration’s first term, who naturally had the highest hopes for better dialogue, are gone, with many of them leaving just as convinced as their Bush predecessors that real dialogue was difficult if not impossible. Don’t expect a second term to yield better results with such a dialogue.

#### South China Sea is on the brink of conflict- Chinese provocations mean risk of miscalc and escalation are high- even Chinese security experts agree

Pradhan 12/11/12

[S D Pradhan has served as chairman of India's Joint Intelligence Committee. He has also been the country's deputy national security adviser. He was chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence Mechanism (2008-2010), which was constituted to review the functioning of the intelligence agencies. He has taught at the departments of defence studies and history at the Punjabi University, Patiala. He was also a visiting professor at the University of Illinois, US, in the department of arms control and disarmament studies. <http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ChanakyaCode/entry/china-pushes-south-china-sea-closer-to-a-conflict> ETB]

China following a well-crafted strategy is systematically moving to establish its control over the area it claims in SCS. As a first step, it formed a Committee of thirteen agencies/departments in February 2012 to fabricate evidence and publicise its claims over the most area in SCS shown through the nine dotted lines. After it made recommendations, China in its new biometric passports projected all the areas in the SCS as belonging to China. These passports also show parts of India as belonging to China. This act of China generated a strong reaction in the neighbouring countries as also in other countries using SCS for trade. While both Vietnam and the Philippines refused to stamp the Chinese travel documents, India began to stamp its own version of the Indian Territory. Jakarta called the Chinese act as counter-productive and the US described these Chinese passports as unhelpful to the resolution of disputes. The second step was the establishment of the prefectural level city of Sansha to administer the Paracel and Spratly Islands in June 2012. Soon after this, China created a military command base there. And as the third step of its strategy, China declared that its police in the Southern Chinese Island of Hainan on the SCS has been authorised to board and search any ship they deem illegal in the "Chinese waters". The new regulations are to be enforced from the 1st January 2013. All these acts of China are in fact potential triggers for conflicts in the region. China is also continuing with its provocative actions. On 30th November, 2012 Vietnam accused a Chinese fishing boat for cutting the cables of its exploration vessel Binh Minh 02. On expected lines, China on the other hand stated that Vietnam expelled its fishing vessels from its waters. The cutting of cables by China has been criticised even by Chinese security experts like Professor Zhu Feng of International Relations at Peking University. China has also stated that its patrol boats would be around Scarborough Shoal. Such provocative acts can result into a conflict. China is now seen as creator of hurdles in the steps being taken by ASEAN to resolve the issue peacefully. The Chinese reluctance to discuss the issue at multilateral forums continues. The ASEAN July meeting in Cambodia clearly established that China keeps on using its influence on Cambodia, the present Chair of ASEAN to ensure that the SCS disputes are not properly discussed. Even the recent ASEAN Summit reflected that the issue remains hostage to the Chinese policy of not allowing proper discussion and projection of the disputes. The neighbours of China also see that the Chinese modernisation of the armed forces at a break-neck speed is not meant to defend its interests but to threaten them into submission. The recent landing of J 15 on the newly acquired air-craft carrier has alarmed the powers interested in the region. They also note that Chinese official defence budget has crossed $106 bn this year. The Chinese policies and posture are causing an armed race in the SCS region. While Vietnam and Philippines are looking to acquire arms to counter the Chinese activities, Japan is also re-orienting its defence policy. Outside powers are now becoming more assertive in stating that they intend to protect the freedom of navigation. In addition, they are also guided by their strategic objectives. US not only have Asia pivot policy but are clearly taking steps to protect the US interests by enhancing their presences in this region. The situation can be rightly termed as alarming. The security experts in China's neighbouring nations are getting seriously concerned about the Chinese activities. Their security experts point out that modernisation of the Chinese Navy is a major security concern. They point out that the Chinese rise is not peaceful. They are suggesting that suitable up-gradation of their armed forces is imperative in view of developing security environment. An assessment of the situation reveal clearly that the Chinese posturing and activities have moved up from being merely "a concern" to "a serious threat" to the region's stability. Such Chinese activities have made the situation highly explosive. Even an unintended incident can act as a trigger for a conflict. Today the South China Sea stands very close to a conflict than ever before. The moot question is whether something can be done at this stage or not to save the world from a conflict. The Chinese leaders, who have great sense for learning from historical experiences, should be able to see that their activities are not in their interests. They are getting marginalised in the International Community. The present policy of International Community of managing and engaging China has limits and the moment China crosses the proverbial Rubicon, the concerned powers would abandon this policy and resort to arms to protect their interests. It may be recalled that before the Second World War, UK had adopted the policy of "Appeasement" which was also followed by France and others to a point but when Hitler's Germany decided to attack Poland, they abandoned it and the war followed. Peace loving people do not like to hear the "sound of cannons" but when it comes to protecting their national interests, they would not mind listening to cancerous sound of guns.

**Territorial disputes snowball - causes nuclear conflict**

**Chakraborty 10**

(Tuhin Subhro Chakraborty, Research Associate at Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies (RGICS), his primary area of work is centered on East Asia and International Relations. His recent work includes finding an alternative to the existing security dilemma in East Asia and the Pacific and Geo Political implications of the ‘Rise of China’. Prior to joining RGICS, he was associated with the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution of India (USI) where he examined the role of India in securing Asia Pacific. He has coordinated conferences and workshops on United Nation Peacekeeping Visions and on China’s Quest for Global Dominance. He has written commentaries on issues relating to ASEAN, Asia Pacific Security Dilemma and US China relations. He also contributed in carrying out simulation exercise on the ‘Afghanistan Scenario’ for the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). Tuhin interned at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), Sapru House, wherein he worked on the Rise of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military budget and its impact on India. He graduated from St. Stephen’s College, Delhi and thereafter he undertook his masters in East Asian Studies from University of Delhi. His areas of interest include China, India-Japan bilateral relations, ASEAN, Asia Pacific security dynamics and Nuclear Issues, The United States Service Institution of India, 2010, “The Initiation & Outlook of ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus Eight”, <http://www.usiofindia.org/Article/?pub=Strategic%20Perspective&pubno=20&ano=739>)

The first ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight (China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Russia and the USA) was held on the 12th of October. When this frame work of ADMM Plus Eight came into news for the first time it was seen as a development which could be the initiating step to a much needed security architecture in the Asia Pacific. Asia Pacific is fast emerging as the economic center of the world, consequently securing of vulnerable economic assets has becomes mandatory. The source of threat to economic assets is basically unconventional in nature like natural disasters, terrorism and maritime piracy. This coupled with the conventional security threats and **flashpoints** **based on territorial disputes** and political differences **are** very much a part of the region posing **a major security challenge.¶** As mentioned ADMM Plus Eight can be seen as the first initiative on such a large scale where the security concerns of the region can be discussed and areas of cooperation can be explored to keep the threats at bay. The defence ministers of the ten ASEAN nations and the eight extra regional countries (Plus Eight) during the meeting have committed to cooperation and dialogue to counter insecurity in the region. One of the major reasons for initiation of such a framework has been the new face of threat which is non-conventional and transnational which makes it very difficult for an actor to deal with it in isolation. Threats related to violent extremism, maritime security, vulnerability of SLOCs, transnational crimes have a direct and indirect bearing on the path of economic growth. Apart from this the existence of **territorial** **disputes** especially **on the maritime** **front** **plus** **the** issues related to political differences, **rise of China** and dispute on the Korean Peninsula **has aggravated the security dilemma** in the region **giving rise to** areas of **potential** **conflict**. This can be seen as a more of a conventional threat to the region.¶ The question here is that how far this ADMM Plus Eight can go to address the conventional security threats or is it an initiative which would be confined to meetings and passing resolution and playing second fiddle to the ASEAN summit. It is very important to realize that when one is talking about effective security architecture for the Asia Pacific one has to talk in terms of addressing the conventional issues like the **territorial** and political **disputes**. These issues **serve as bigger flashpoint which can snowball into** a major conflict which has the possibility of turning into a **nuclear conflict.**

#### US gets drawn in

Peimani ‘12

[Dr Hooman Peimani is head of the Energy Security Division and a principal fellow at the Energy Studies Institute, National University of Singapore. <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1102286/indias-claim-south-china-sea-further-polarises-rows> ETB]

Any conflict between China, the Philippines and Vietnam over the disputed South China Sea islands would inevitably damage all three parties. That may well lead to intervention by an outsider, particularly the US, given its interests in the region. This would internationalise the dispute and legitimise a long-term US military presence in China's proximity, which Beijing has sought to avoid.¶ Within this context, any deployment of the Indian navy in the South China Sea in defence of its oil interests would also contribute to such "internationalisation" while increasing the possibility of naval clashes.¶ The ownership disputes are already having a polarising effect in the region, along pro-China and pro-US lines, and the Indian navy's announcement will only intensify this. And that can't be good news for Beijing, which has been trying to prevent the US from further upsetting the regional balance of power, which is already in Washington's favour.

**US-China war goes nuclear**

**Hunkovic ‘09**

Lee J. Hunkovic -- professor at American Military University, 09, [“The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, American Military University, p.54]

**A war between China**, Taiwan **and the U**nited **S**tates **has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war**, therefore, **many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain,** if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, **if China and the U**nited **S**tates **engage in** a full-scale **conflict, there are few countries** in the world **that will not be** economically and/or militarily **affected by it.** However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

### Solvency

#### DoD acquisition of SMR’s ensures rapid military adoption, commercialization, and U.S. leadership

Andres and Breetz ‘11

Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications, [www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)

Thus far, this paper has reviewed two of DOD’s most pressing energy vulnerabilities—grid insecurity and fuel convoys—and explored how they could be addressed by small reactors. We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors. On the other hand, failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD, which we review in this section: first, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries. By taking an early “first mover” role in the small reactor market, DOD could mitigate these risks and secure the long-term availability and appropriateness of these technologies for U.S. military applications. The “Valley of Death.” Given the promise that small reactors hold for military installations and mobility, DOD has a compelling interest in ensuring that they make the leap from paper to production. However, if DOD does not provide an initial demonstration and market, there is a chance that the U.S. small reactor industry may never get off the ground. The leap from the laboratory to the marketplace is so difficult to bridge that it is widely referred to as the “Valley of Death.” Many promising technologies are never commercialized due to a variety of market failures— including technical and financial uncertainties, information asymmetries, capital market imperfections, transaction costs, and environmental and security externalities— that impede financing and early adoption and can lock innovative technologies out of the marketplace. 28 In such cases, the Government can help a worthy technology to bridge the Valley of Death by accepting the first mover costs and demonstrating the technology’s scientific and economic viability.29 [FOOTNOTE 29: There are numerous actions that the Federal Government could take, such as conducting or funding research and development, stimulating private investment, demonstrating technology, mandating adoption, and guaranteeing markets. Military procurement is thus only one option, but it has often played a decisive role in technology development and is likely to be the catalyst for the U.S. small reactor industry. See Vernon W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Kira R. Fabrizio and David C. Mowery, “The Federal Role in Financing Major Inventions: Information Technology during the Postwar Period,” in Financing Innovation in the United States, 1870 to the Present, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), 283–316.] Historically, nuclear power has been “the most clear-cut example . . . of an important general-purpose technology that in the absence of military and defense related procurement would not have been developed at all.”30 Government involvement is likely to be crucial for innovative, next-generation nuclear technology as well. Despite the widespread revival of interest in nuclear energy, Daniel Ingersoll has argued that radically innovative designs face an uphill battle, as “the high capital cost of nuclear plants and the painful lessons learned during the first nuclear era have created a prevailing fear of first-of-a-kind designs.”31 In addition, Massachusetts Institute of Technology reports on the Future of Nuclear Power called for the Government to provide modest “first mover” assistance to the private sector due to several barriers that have hindered the nuclear renaissance, such as securing high up-front costs of site-banking, gaining NRC certification for new technologies, and demonstrating technical viability.32 It is possible, of course, that small reactors will achieve commercialization without DOD assistance. As discussed above, they have garnered increasing attention in the energy community. Several analysts have even argued that small reactors could play a key role in the second nuclear era, given that they may be the only reactors within the means of many U.S. utilities and developing countries.33 However, given the tremendous regulatory hurdles and technical and financial uncertainties, it appears far from certain that the U.S. small reactor industry will take off. If DOD wants to ensure that small reactors are available in the future, then it should pursue a leadership role now. Technological Lock-in. A second risk is that if small reactors do reach the market without DOD assistance, the designs that succeed may not be optimal for DOD’s applications. Due to a variety of positive feedback and increasing returns to adoption (including demonstration effects, technological interdependence, network and learning effects, and economies of scale), the designs that are initially developed can become “locked in.”34 Competing designs—even if they are superior in some respects or better for certain market segments— can face barriers to entry that lock them out of the market. If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred designs are not locked out, then it should take a first mover role on small reactors. It is far too early to gauge whether the private market and DOD have aligned interests in reactor designs. On one hand, Matthew Bunn and Martin Malin argue that what the world needs is cheaper, safer, more secure, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors; presumably, many of the same broad qualities would be favored by DOD.35 There are many varied market niches that could be filled by small reactors, because there are many different applications and settings in which they can be used, and it is quite possible that some of those niches will be compatible with DOD’s interests.36 On the other hand, DOD may have specific needs (transportability, for instance) that would not be a high priority for any other market segment. Moreover, while DOD has unique technical and organizational capabilities that could enable it to pursue more radically innovative reactor lines, DOE has indicated that it will focus its initial small reactor deployment efforts on LWR designs.37 If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred reactors are developed and available in the future, it should take a leadership role now. Taking a first mover role does not necessarily mean that DOD would be “picking a winner” among small reactors, as the market will probably pursue multiple types of small reactors. Nevertheless, DOD leadership would likely have a profound effect on the industry’s timeline and trajectory. Domestic Nuclear Expertise. From the perspective of larger national security issues, if DOD does not catalyze the small reactor industry, there is a risk that expertise in small reactors could become dominated by foreign companies. A 2008 Defense Intelligence Agency report warned that the United States will become totally dependent on foreign governments for future commercial nuclear power unless the military acts as the prime mover to reinvigorate this critical energy technology with small, distributed power reactors.38 Several of the most prominent small reactor concepts rely on technologies perfected at Federally funded laboratories and research programs, including the Hyperion Power Module (Los Alamos National Laboratory), NuScale (DOE-sponsored research at Oregon State University), IRIS (initiated as a DOE-sponsored project), Small and Transportable Reactor (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), and Small, Sealed, Transportable, Autonomous Reactor (developed by a team including the Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories). However, there are scores of competing designs under development from over a dozen countries. If DOD does not act early to support the U.S. small reactor industry, there is a chance that the industry could be dominated by foreign companies. Along with other negative consequences, the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry decreases the NRC’s influence on the technology that supplies the world’s rapidly expanding demand for nuclear energy. Unless U.S. companies begin to retake global market share, in coming decades France, China, South Korea, and Russia will dictate standards on nuclear reactor reliability, performance, and proliferation resistance.

#### Military procurement solves commercial use and avoids regulations

Andres and Loudermilk ‘10

(Richard B. Andres, Professor of ¶ national Security Strategy at the ¶ national War College and a Senior fellow and energy and environmental ¶ Security and Policy Chair in the Center ¶ for Strategic research, institute for national Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University, Micah J, Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, “Small Reactors and the Military’s Role in Securing America’s Nuclear IndustryPosted” <http://robertmayer.wordpress.com/2010/08/28/small-reactors-and-the-militarys-role-in-securing-americas-nuclear-industryposted/>, SEH)

Unlike private industry, the military does not face the same regulatory and congressional hurdles to constructing reactors and would have an easier time in adopting them for use. By integrating small nuclear reactors as power sources for domestic U.S. military bases, three potential energy dilemmas are solved at the same time. First, by incorporating small reactors at its bases, the military addresses its own energy security quandary. The military has recently sought to “island” its bases in the U.S. -protecting them from grid outages, be they accidental or intentional. The Department of Defense has promoted this endeavor through lowering energy consumption on bases and searching for renewable power alternatives, but these measures alone will prove insufficient. Small reactors provide sufficient energy output to power military installations and in some cases surrounding civilian population centers.¶ Secondly, as the reactors become integrated on military facilities, the stigma on the nuclear power industry will ease and inroads will be created for the adoption of small-scale reactors as a viable source of energy. Private industry and the public will see that nuclear reactors can indeed be utilized safely and effectively, resulting in a renewed push toward the expansion of nuclear power. Although many of the same hurdles will still be in place, a shift in public opinion and a stronger effort by utilities, coupled with the demonstrated success of small reactors on military bases, could prove the catalysts necessary for the federal government and the NRC to take more aggressive action.¶ Finally, while new reactors are not likely in the near future, the military’s actions will preserve, for a while longer, the badly ailing domestic nuclear energy industry. Nuclear power is here to stay around the globe, and the United States has an opportunity to take a leading role in supplying the world’s nuclear energy and reactor technology. With the U.S. nuclear industry dormant for three decades, much of the attention, technology, and talent have concentrated overseas in countries with a strong interest in nuclear technology. Without the United States as a player in the nuclear energy market, it has little say over safety regulations of reactors or the potential risks of proliferation from the expansion of nuclear energy. If the current trend continues, the U.S. will reach a point where it is forced to import nuclear technology and reactors from other countries. Action by the military to install reactors on domestic bases will both guarantee the survival of the American nuclear industry in the short term, and work to solidify support for it in the long run.¶ Ultimately, between small-scale nuclear reactors and the U.S. military, the capability exists to revitalize America’s sleeping nuclear industry and promoting energy security and clean energy production. The reactors offer the ability to power domestic military bases, small towns, and other remote locations detached from the energy grid. Furthermore, reactor sites can house multiple units, allowing for greater energy production – rivaling even large reactors. Small reactors offer numerous benefits to the United States and a path initiated by the military presents a realistic route by which their adoption can be achieved.

#### SMRs are cost-effective, safe, and can be quickly deployed

Szondy 12

David, freelance writer based in Monroe, Washington. An award-winning playwright, he has contributed to Charged and iQ magazine and is the author of the website Tales of Future Past, February 16, "Feature: Small modular nuclear reactors - the future of energy?", [www.gizmag.com/small-modular-nuclear-reactors/20860/](http://www.gizmag.com/small-modular-nuclear-reactors/20860/)

One way of getting around many of these problems is through the development of small modular reactors (SMR). These are reactors capable of generating about 300 megawatts of power or less, which is enough to run 45,000 US homes. Though small, SMRs are proper reactors. They are quite different from the radio-thermal generators (RTG) used in spacecraft and remote lighthouses in Siberia. Nuclear reactors such as SMRs use controlled nuclear fission to generate power while RTGs use natural radioactive decay to power a relatively simple thermoelectric generator that can only produce, at most, about two kilowatts.¶ In terms of power, RTGs are the equivalent of batteries while small nuclear reactors are only "small" when compared to conventional reactors. They are hardly the sort that you would keep in the garage. In reality, SMR power plants would cover the area of a small shopping mall. Still, such an installation is not very large as power plants go and a reactor that only produces 300 megawatts may not seem worth the investment, but the US Department of Energy is offering US$452 million in matching grants to develop SMRs and private investors like the Bill Gates Foundation and the company of Babcock and Wilcox are putting up money for their own modular reactor projects.¶ The 60-year old breakthrough¶ One reason for government and private industry to take an interest in SMRs is that they've been successfully employed for much longer than most people realize. In fact, hundreds have been steaming around the world inside the hulls of nuclear submarines and other warships for sixty years. They've also been used in merchant ships, icebreakers and as research and medical isotope reactors at universities. There was even one installed in the Antarctic at McMurdo Station from 1962 to 1972. Now they're being considered for domestic use.¶ The case for SMRs¶ SMRs have a number of advantages over conventional reactors. For one thing, SMRs are cheaper to construct and run. This makes them very attractive to poorer, energy-starved countries; small, growing communities that don't require a full-scale plant; and remote locations such as mines or desalination plants. Part of the reason for this is simply that the reactors are smaller. Another is that, not needing to be custom designed in each case, the reactors can be standardized and some types built in factories that are able to employ economies of scale. The factory-built aspect is also important because a factory is more efficient than on-site construction by as much as eight to one in terms of building time. Factory construction also allows SMRs to be built, delivered to the site, and then returned to the factory for dismantling at the end of their service lives - eliminating a major problem with old conventional reactors, i.e. how to dispose of them.¶ SMRs also enjoy a good deal of design flexibility. Conventional reactors are usually cooled by water - a great deal of water - which means that the reactors need to be situated near rivers or coastlines. SMRs, on the other hand, can be cooled by air, gas, low-melting point metals or salt. This means that SMRs can be placed in remote, inland areas where it isn't possible to site conventional reactors.¶ Safety¶ This cooling system is often passive. In other words, it relies more on the natural circulation of the cooling medium within the reactor's containment flask than on pumps. This passive cooling is one of the ways that SMRs can improve safety. Because modular reactors are smaller than conventional ones, they contain less fuel. This means that there's less of a mass to be affected if an accident occurs. If one does happen, there's less radioactive material that can be released into the environment and makes it easier to design emergency systems. Since they are smaller and use less fuel, they are easier to cool effectively, which greatly reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic accident or meltdown in the first place.¶ This also means that accidents proceed much slower in modular reactors than in conventional ones. Where the latter need accident responses in a matter of hours or minutes, SMRs can be responded to in hours or days, which reduces the chances of an accident resulting in major damage to the reactor elements.¶ The SMR designs that reject water cooling in favor of gas, metal or salt have their own safety advantages. Unlike water-cooled reactors, these media operate at a lower pressure. One of the hazards of water cooling is that a cracked pipe or a damaged seal can blow radioactive gases out like anti-freeze out of an overheated car radiator. With low-pressure media, there's less force to push gases out and there's less stress placed on the containment vessel. It also eliminates one of the frightening episodes of the Fukushima accident where the water in the vessel broke down into hydrogen and oxygen and then exploded.¶ Another advantage of modular design is that some SMRs are small enough to be installed below ground. That is cheaper, faster to construct and less invasive than building a reinforced concrete containment dome. There is also the point that putting a reactor in the ground makes it less vulnerable to earthquakes. Underground installations make modular reactors easier to secure and install in a much smaller footprint. This makes SMRs particularly attractive to military customers who need to build power plants for bases quickly. Underground installation also enhances security with fewer sophisticated systems needed, which also helps bring down costs.¶ SMRs can help with proliferation, nuclear waste and fuel supply issues because, while some modular reactors are based on conventional pressurized water reactors and burn enhanced uranium, others use less conventional fuels. Some, for example, can generate power from what is now regarded as "waste", burning depleted uranium and plutonium left over from conventional reactors. Depleted uranium is basically U-238 from which the fissible U-235 has been consumed. It's also much more abundant in nature than U-235, which has the potential of providing the world with energy for thousands of years. Other reactor designs don't even use uranium. Instead, they use thorium. This fuel is also incredibly abundant, is easy to process for use as fuel and has the added bonus of being utterly useless for making weapons, so it can provide power even to areas where security concerns have been raised.¶ But there's still the sticking point that modular reactors are, by definition, small. That may be fine for a submarine or the South Pole, but what about places that need more? Is the alternative conventional nuclear plants? It turns out that the answer is no. Modular reactors don't need to be used singly. They can be set up in batteries of five or six or even more, providing as much power as an area needs. And if one unit needs to be taken off line for repairs or even replacement, it needn't interfere with the operation of the others.

#### Nuclear power is inevitable

IAEA applications

Middle class

Population growth

Urbanization

Warming

Desal

Ebinger and Squassoni ‘11

Charles K Ebinger and Sharon Squassoni 11, Charles is senior fellow and director of the Energy Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution, Sharon is senior fellow and director of the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Industry and Emerging Nuclear Energy Markets” in “Business and Nonproliferation”, googlebooks

As mentioned previously, a notable feature of the nuclear renaissance is the widespread interest in nuclear power, especially in countries without a commercial nuclear infrastructure. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), at least sixty-five countries have expressed such interest, most from outside the industrialized economies of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the main locus of nuclear power capacity at present. Most of the capacity growth up to 2030 is expected to occur in the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Far East. As part of this growth, eleven developing countries are serious candidates for first reactors, although progress in carrying out their plans varies widely (see table 4-1). These countries are drawing new suppliers into the nuclear market (notably China, India, and South Korea) and sparking activity among existing suppliers such as Russia and Japan. Overall, however, many countries will not be able to follow through on growth plans owing to cost, limited grid capacity, and perhaps public resistance. Countries are moving toward nuclear energy, not the mention other sources of primary fuel, in large part because of mounting demand: between 2008 and 2035 global electricity consumption is expected to increase 80 percent, and 80 percent of that growth will take place in non-OECD countries. Underlying this large increase in electricity demand are population growth, urbanization, concerns about CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, energy security, and pressure from a growing middle class for goods and services using or produced by electricity. Over this period, global population will rise from 6.7 billion to 8.5 billion, with 7.2 billion of the total living in non-OECD countries. Most of this increase will take place in China, India, and the Middle East, with the balance in the rest of the developing world, while the share of the global population in the OECD and Russia will decline. Today nearly 1.4 billion people have no electricity, a figure that may well increase with further population growth, despite movement into the modern energy economy. Urbanization will undoubtedly push demand up as well. For the first time in history, a majority of the world’s population is living in urban areas, a trend likely to continue, especially in developing countries. With the movement of hundreds of millions of people from rural areas to cities, more communities will turn from traditional and often free fuels (wood, forest residues, agricultural wastes, bagasse, and dung) to modern fuels such as electricity, natural gas, and petroleum products. The dramatic growth of the middle class in a number of emerging market nations is also having a large impact on energy consumption. The World Bank predicts that by 2030 the middle class in these nations will jump to 1.2 billion from 430 million in 2000. It is estimated that in India alone, a country that before Fukushima was developing plans for nuclear power, the number of households with an annual disposal income of $5,000-$15,000 will increase from 36 percent of the population in 2010 to more than 58 percent by 2020. Climate change, too, will have some of its largest impact in developing countries, which, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), will be responsible for nearly all of the projected global increase in CO2 emissions by 2035. In large part, the cause of this rise is coal-fired power in China and India. The urgency of finding alternatives to coal is recognized by others as well, including Indonesia, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, and Russia. Compared with developed countries, developing nations rely far more on imported fossil fuels, especially oil, to generate power. When the price of oil on the world market rose to $147 a barrel in 2008, it became clear that dependence on imported fossil fuels for electricity generation can destroy a nation’s economy and that fuel diversification is vital for energy security. As prices climbed beyond $100 a barrel, Jordan, a country committed to introducing civilian nuclear energy, was particularly hard hit: 99 percent of its electricity is generated from either oil or gas, 96 percent of which is imported. Developing countries also see nuclear energy as a possible source of power for desalination plants, especially in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and elsewhere in the Middle East. As the demand for freshwater supplies increases – along with the emphasis on limited the use of fossil fuels to generates electricity because of the impact of emissions, price volatility, and supply disruptions – the nuclear option will be considered even more viable. Moreover, some countries with large resources of oil or gas, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, are hoping nuclear power will help reduce their domestic use of these fuels in generating power and will boost the financial benefits of exporting them. For some developing countries, status and geopolitics are undoubtedly important factors in considering the development or expansion of a civilian nuclear energy program. In the view of Turkey’s energy minister Hilmi Guler, for instance, nuclear technology is a requirement for a seat at the table with the ten most developed countries in the world.

#### Obama has pushed SMRs

Kramer ‘12

(David J. Kramer was educated at Tufts University, receiving his B.A. in Soviet Studies and Political Science, and then at Harvard University, receiving his M.A. in Soviet Studies. “Romney, Obama surrogates spell out candidates’ energy policies” September 2012 Accessed online at http://www.physicstoday.org/resource/1/phtoad/v65/i9/p20\_s10, TSW)

The Obama administration’s support for nuclear power is evident from the $7 billion loan guarantee from DOE to back construction of two new reactors at an existing nuclear power plant in Georgia, Reicher noted. “There’s serious money going into small modular reactors and serious policy work going on in how to reform the licensing process” at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to expedite approval.

#### Current manufacturing capability can switch to SMR

U.S. DOC ‘11

(“The Commercial Outlook for¶ U.S. Small Modular Nuclear¶ Reactors” <http://www.trade.gov/publications/pdfs/the-commercial-outlook-for-us-small-modular-nuclear-reactors.pdf>, SEH)

Impact of SMRs on U.S. Job ¶ Creation¶ **A serious obstacle to the resurgence of traditional ¶ nuclear power in the United States is the eroded ¶ domestic manufacturing capacity for the major ¶ nuclear components. A robust program of building SMRs, however, could make use of existing ¶ domestic capacity that is already capable of completely constructing most proposed SMR designs. ¶ SMRs would not require the ultra-heavy forgings ¶ that currently can only be made overseas**. **U.S. ¶ suppliers say that firms could retool using existing ¶ capabilities and resources and could source most ¶ of the components of SMRs here in the United ¶ States**. This ability could mean tremendous new ¶ commercial opportunities for U.S. firms and ¶ workers. ¶ **A substantial SMR deployment program in the ¶ United States could result in the creation of many ¶ new jobs in manufacturing, engineering, transportation, construction (f**or site preparation and ¶ installation) and craft labor, professional services, ¶ and ongoing plant operations. As SMR manufacturers prove their designs in the domestic market, ¶ they will likely consider export opportunities. The ¶ modular nature of SMRs and their relative portability means that locating export-oriented SMR ¶ manufacturing and assembly could make sense ¶ for U.S. companies, as opposed to the localization that is typically necessary for building larger ¶ reactors.

# 2AC Block was Nietzsche, Case

### Solvency

#### The DoD is exempt from NRC regulations

US-NRC 12

(“§ 50.11 Exceptions and exemptions from licensing requirements” <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0011.html>, date last updated, SEH)

§ 50.11 Exceptions and exemptions from licensing requirements.¶ Nothing in this part shall be deemed to require a license for:¶ (a) The manufacture, production, or acquisition by the Department of Defense of any utilization facility authorized pursuant to section 91 of the Act, or the use of such facility by the Department of Defense or by a person under contract with and for the account of the Department of Defense;

#### Licensing quick

NEI ‘11

Nuclear Energy Institute, “Myths and Facts about Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)”, June 7 2011 is last date cited, [www.nei.org/filefolder/MythsFacts.pdf](http://www.nei.org/filefolder/MythsFacts.pdf)

UCS statement: “The distributed deployment of small reactors would put great strains on licensing and inspection resources. Nuclear reactors are qualitatively different from other types of generating facilities, not least because they require a much more intensive safety and security inspection regime.”¶ The Facts: This is speculation that is not supported by any measure of NRC’s past and present resources. NRC has consistently been appropriated sufficient resources, and licensees then reimburse the agency for all licensing and inspection costs, so there is no factual evidence that deployment of SMRs would place any strain on NRC resources.

#### No link Seawater mining increasing Uranium supplies

Prigg 8/21

(Mark Prigg “Are oceans the future of nuclear power? Scientists move closer to extracting uranium from seawater” 11:17 EST, 21 August 2012 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2191571/Do-oceans-hold-future-nuclear-power-Scientists-closer-extracting-uranium-seawater.html>, TSW)

Extracting uranium from seawater is closer to becoming an economic reality which could guarantee the future of nuclear power, scientists said today.¶ The world's oceans hold at least four billion tons of the precious metal.¶ But for the past four decades, the goal of mining seawater for uranium has remained a dream because of the technical difficulties and high cost.¶ Today, a report presented to a scientific meeting showed that fast progress is being made towards turning the oceans into a uranium reservoir.¶ Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station: Researchers believe that uranium in the sea could be the future of nuclear power¶ Improvements to the extraction technology have almost halved production costs from around 560 dollars (£355) per pound of uranium to 300 dollars (£190).¶ Dr Robin Rogers, from the University of Alabama, told the annual meeting of the American Chemical Society in Philadelphia: 'Estimates indicate that the oceans are a mother lode of uranium, with far more uranium dissolved in seawater than in all the known terrestrial deposits that can be mined.¶ 'The difficulty has always been that the concentration is just very, very low, making the cost of extraction high.¶ 'But we are gaining on that challenge.'¶ The standard extraction technique, developed in Japan, uses mats of braided plastic fibres embedded with compounds that capture uranium atoms.¶ Each mat is 50 to 100 yards long and suspended 100 to 200 yards under the water. ¶ After being brought back to the surface, the mats are rinsed with a mild acid solution to recover the uranium. ¶ They are then dunked in the water again in a process that can be repeated several times.¶ The new work involves making cheaper and more efficient versions of the mats and the compounds that latch onto uranium.¶ A team led by Dr Rogers is exploring the use of waste shrimp shells from the seafood industry to produce a biodegradable mat material.¶ Dr Erich Schneider, from the University of Texas, another speaker at the American Chemical Society symposium, said the aim was to establish seawater uranium as an 'economic backstop' that will sustain the nuclear power industry.¶ The world's oceans are a rich source of uranium - and scientists believe they may have found a way to extract it¶ Nuclear power plants are built to operate for 60 years or longer and involve a huge investment, he told the meeting. ¶ Before committing themselves to building nuclear plants, energy companies had to be sure they can source reasonably priced uranium for many decades to come.¶ 'This uncertainty around whether there's enough terrestrial uranium is impacting the decision-making in the industry, because it's hard to make long-term research and development or deployment decisions in the face of big uncertainties about the resource,' said Dr Schneider. ¶ 'So if we can tap into uranium from seawater, we can remove that uncertainty.'¶ Seawater extraction of uranium may also have environmental advantages, the meeting heard.¶ Traditional uranium mining produced contaminated wastewater and posed health risks for miners.

### Grid

#### There heg turns don’t make a lot of sense, they have no specific offense against US heg in the form of maintaining squo military operations there is only a risk of decline that’s Stockton ‘11, absent plan troop levels don’t change or cause retrenchemt and independtly US lashes out nucelar if the grid goes down that’s tilford ‘12

#### Extend Barnett ’11 globalization, democracy and economic growth have all checked conflict preventing nuclear.

#### Hegemony is sustainable—flexibility and adaptability make the US resilient

Lieber ‘12

[Robert J. Lieber, 2012, PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates , “Power and Willpower In the American Future”, pg. 4-5, Google Books,]

For the United States, as I argue here, the maintenance of its leading role matters greatly. The alternative would not only be a more disorderly and dangerous world in which its own economic and national security would be adversely affected, hut also regional conflicts and the spread of nuclear weapons would be more likely.In addition, allies and those sharing common values, especially liberal democracy and the market economy, would increasingly be at risk. Ultimately, America’s ability to avoid serious decline and the significant international retrenchment that would be a result of severely reduced resources becomes a matter of policy and political will. There is nothing inevitable about decline, **and** both past experience and national attributes matter greatly. Flexibility, adaptability, and the capacity for course correction provide the United States with a resilience that has proved invaluable in the past and is likely to do so in the future.

**Us intervention is inevitable – the plan prevents ineffective forms of engagement**

Robert **Kagan 2011**. Contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. "The Price of Power" Jan 24 Vol 16 No18 www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3

**In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and** Alice **Rivlin** certainly **reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions**, especially those with mixed or dubious results. **It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898:** Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present**That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years**, or roughly 47 percent of the time. **Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years** and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. **The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention**. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. **One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit.** **Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions**. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued.To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. **But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure**. Is such a sharp departure in the offing**? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all.** **It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years**—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history. **So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country.** There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. **Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war.** On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. **Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid**. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. **Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula**, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; **and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia,** should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, **can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help?Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan**. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, **the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity**, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? **The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively**, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate? **The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always**, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But **history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.**

**Best studies show that the amounts of intra- and interstate violence are lower than ever due to US hegemony – the alt is genocidal anarchy**

Steven **Pinker 2011**. Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html

On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence. Somewhere in the world there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?" But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?" Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. **Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species**. The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children. This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood. Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals. **Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence**. **The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations**, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago. For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And **ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control**. These investigations show that, on average**, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states**. **Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes**" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history. It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves. **The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide. The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks**. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back. Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors. **The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment**. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. **The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution**. At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery. The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace. Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But **centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently,** **Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population). Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict.** They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars. The fifth trend, which I call **the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations**. § Marked 16:17 § Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers. The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And **the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined** even **more precipitously**. **The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%**. **The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet**. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end. Finally, **the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales**. In the developed world, **the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives** and girlfriends. In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And **the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people.** Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature? This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment. It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." **Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels.** **The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force.** A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels. **We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe**. And **we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice. Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win.** **As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism. For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa.** Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and **we owe them too much money. A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media**. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them. **These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human** affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.

#### Quantifying hegemony is possible.

Hubbard 12

(Jesse, Spring, “Hegemonic Governance and Military Conflict: An Empirical Analysis” Professor Chris Rudolph, SIS, pdf online)

To research this question, I undertook a broad quantitative study that examined ¶ data from both the American and British hegemonic epochs. I hypothesized that ¶ hegemonic strength was inversely correlated with levels of armed conflict in the ¶ international system.¶ Using the data from the Correlates of War Project, I was able to perform a number ¶ of statistical analyses on my hypothesis. To measure hegemonic strength, I used the ¶ Composite Index of National Capability, a metric that averages together six different ¶ dimensions of relative power as a share of total power in the international system. I then ¶ matched this data with data cataloging all conflicts in the international system since 1815. ¶ I organized this data into five-year increments in order to make statistical analysis more ¶ feasible. Regression analysis of the data revealed that there was a statistically significant ¶ negative correlation between relative hegemonic power and conflict levels in the ¶ international system. Further statistical tests attempted to explore the causal mechanism ¶ behind the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. What these results ¶ revealed was that Britain and the United States engaged in more conflicts as a percent of ¶ total conflicts in the system during the years of rising hegemony than during the years of ¶ falling hegemony. Furthermore, the strong correlation evident when the period as a whole ¶ is examined disappears when the focus turns solely to the years of rising hegemony, or to ¶ years during which the hegemon did not play an active role in the international system. ¶ These results may indicate that a hegemon’s raw power does not deter conflict unless ¶ other actors in the system see the deterrent as credible

**The aff solves genocide- the K is an apologist for global genocide.**

**Shaw 01** (IR Prof – Sussex, Review of International Studies 27)

That these are indeed ‘yesterday’s visions’ is clear from the selective way in which they are used**. It is a curious anti-imperialism that attacks the so-called ‘imperialism of human rights’69 but provides the defence of sovereignty to the imperialism of genocidal oppression**.70 Something is wrong with the radical tradition, when as distinguished a representative as Edward Said could write of the Kosovo war that what he found ‘most distressing’ was the ‘destruction from the air’ wrought by American power71—not the genocidal massacres by Serbian forces that prompted NATO’s (admittedly problematic) response. Said has reminded us recently of what Thompson called the ‘Natopolitan’ world, in which many intellectuals were indirectly on the payroll of the CIA.72 What he did not acknowledge was its Stalinist counterpart, in which intellectuals sold their souls to the KGB and the Stasi. And there was an anti-Cold War world, in which those who refused the choice of NATO and the Warsaw Pact elaborated their ideas. Although those of us in this intellectual third world turned down the lucre of the blocs, this did not guarantee lasting validity to our ideas. In the new global era, **many characteristic assumptions of the old anti-Cold War left appear increasingly as prejudices. A whole generation has not let go of a mindset**, four elements of which are problematic in the new situation. Most fundamental is a residual Third Worldist ideology. According to this, Western, especially American, imperialism is the touchstone for all world politics. Said’s anachronistic conclusion about Kosovo was to ask: ‘When will the smaller, lesser, weaker peoples realize that this America is to be resisted at all costs, not pandered to or given in to naively?’73 There are strong criticisms to be made of American and NATO policies in Kosovo. However **a systematic blindness lies behind the continuing belief that America is the principal problem, coupled with the failure to recognize the need for international action against genocide**.74 From this viewpoint, non-Western states are potential sites of resistance, organizers of ‘underdeveloped political economies’75 which can contest the dominant form. While sovereignty in general may be regarded as a political form of capitalist social relations76, the sovereignty of non-Western states must be defended from Western power. **Yet to support** Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, or **Chinese over Tibet, gives sustenance to forms of colonial domination deeply mired in blood**. **Critics find themselves in an inversion of the double standard** of which they accuse NATO: if it is right to support Timorese self-determination against Indonesian claims to sovereignty, **how can the same right be denied to the** Kosovans or **Tibetans?77.**

**Reps about China don’t spur rivalry but they’re key to avoid disaster**

**Friedberg ‘01**

(Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs. Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Commentary, Vol. 111, No. 2, February 2001, p. <https://lists.lsit.ucsb.edu/archives/gordon-newspost/2001-May/001274.html>)

**Is it possible, finally, that merely by talking and perhaps even by thinking about a full-blown SinoAmerican rivalry we may increase the probability of its actually coming to pass?** This is the clear implication of Michael Swaine ’s letter. Mr. Swaine worries that “ordinary observers,” unable to distinguish between descriptions of present reality and “hair-raising scenarios” of the future, will conclude that “an intense geostrategic rivalry is virtually inevitable, and . . . respond accordingly.” **While I am flattered by the thought that my article could somehow change the course of history, I very much doubt that it, or a hundred more like it, will have any such effect. On the other hand, I am disturbed by the suggestion that we ought to avoid discussing unpleasant possibilities for fear that someone (presumably our political representatives and “ordinary” fellow citizens) might get the wrong idea. Acknowledging real dangers is a necessary first step to avoiding them, as well as to preparing to cope with them if they should nevertheless come to pass. Refusing or neglecting to do so, it seems to me, is a far more likely formula for disaster.**

#### Cyber offense outpaces defense

Zach 3/28

(“U.S. Outgunned in Hacker War: WSJ” http://blog.cybersecuritylaw.us/?p=85, SEH)

On March 27th, 2012, Devlin Barret reported for the Wall Street Journal on comments made by Shawn Henry, the FBI's departing cyber head. Notably, Mr. Henry said that in the context of cyber-espionage, the current public and private approach to trying to stop hackers is "unsustainable." It's unsustainable in the sense that the U.S. can "never get ahead, never become secure, [and] never have a reasonable expectation of privacy or security."¶ The WSJ article noted that Mr. Henry criticized the lax cybersecurity efforts of company executives. Over the course of FBI investigations, some companies have discovered that they've been breached for not only months, but years. This, according to Mr. Henry, gave the hackers "full visibility into everything occurring on that network, potentially." However, some company executives still don't recognize that there is a problem. Even if a company decides to build cyber-defenses, Mr. Henry explained that "[y]ou can only build a fence so high . . . the offense outpaces the defense, and the offense is better than the defense."

### China

**Threats are not socially constructed- decision makers use the most objective, rational, and accurate assessments possible- there are no bureaucratic or ideological motivations to invent threats.**

**Ravenal ‘9**

[Earl C. Ravenal, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies @ Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget. He is the author of *Designing Defense for a New World Order.* What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” *Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society* 21.1 (2009) 21-75]

Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny any straightforward, and therefore legitimate, security motive in American foreign and military policy. In fact, this denial leads to a more sweeping rejection of any recognizably rational basis for American foreign policy, and, even, sometimes (among the more theoretical of the non-interventionists), a preference for non-rational accounts, or “models,” of virtually any nation’s foreign policy-making.4 One could call this tendency among anti-imperialists “motive displacement.” More specifically, in the cases under review here, one notes a receptivity to any reworking of history, and any current analysis of geopolitics, that denigrates “the threat”; and, along with this, a positing of “imperialism” (the almost self-referential and primitive impulse) as a sufficient explanation for the often strenuous and risky actions of great powers such as the United States. Thus, not only is “empire” taken to be a sufficient and, in some cases, a necessary condition in bringing about foreign “threats”; but, by minimizing the extent and seriousness of these threats, the anti-imperialists put themselves into the position of lacking a rational explanation for the derivation of the (pointless at best, counter-productive at worst) policies that they designate as imperialistic. A pungent example of this threat denigration and motive displacement is Eland’s account of American intervention in the Korean and Vietnam wars:

After North Korea invaded, the Truman administration intervened merely for the purpose of a demonstration to friends and foes alike. Likewise, according to eminent cold war historians, the United States did not inter- vene in Vietnam because it feared communism, which was fragmented, or the Soviet Union, which wanted détente with the West, or China, which was weak, but because it did not want to appear timid to the world. The behavior of the United States in both Korea and Vietnam is typical of imperial powers, which are always concerned about their reputation, pres- tige, and perceived resolve. (Eland 2004, 64)

Of course, the motive of “reputation,” to the extent that it exists in any particular instance, is a part of the complex of motives that characterize a great power that is drawn toward the role of hegemon (not the same thing as “empire”). Reputation is also a component of the power projec- tion that is designed to serve the interest of national security. Rummaging through the concomitants of “imperialism,” Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of “threat inflation” (in this case, virtual threat invention): Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high. Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled “Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare,” attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budget—particularly the procurement of major weapons systems, such as “Virginia-class submarines . . . aircraft carriers . . . F-22 fighters . . . [and] Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft”—not to the systemically derived requirement for certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no stra- tegic or operational justification; that “the American empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their ‘rogue’ state sponsors without those gold- plated white elephants.”

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:

In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)

Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:

Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.

There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.

This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.

Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.

My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.

Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.

Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.

My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus§ Marked 16:19 § , threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).

A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious, “rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

### 2AC- Nietszche

#### Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else

Amien Kacou. 2008. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, **pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

**Avoiding extinction is necessary to the struggle required to create the overman**

**Connolly 91**

Connolly, Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University, 1991 [William E., Identity/ Difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox, 186]

Zarathustra says: "The most concerned ask today, 'How is man to be preserved?' But Zarathustra is the first and only one to ask: `How is man to be overcome?"16 The idea is to stop worrying about the preservation of man, to strive to create a few overmen. Leave to their own devices those who insist upon being consumed by resentment, so that a few can cultivate another type of humanity. The new type to be cultivated consists of a few free spirits who fend off the resentment against the human condition that wells up in everyone, a few who rise above the insistence that there be symmetry between evil and responsibility, who live above the demand that some guilty agent worthy of punishment be located every time they themselves suffer, who recognize that existential suffering is a precondition of wisdom. But this typological differentiation between man and overman no longer makes much sense, if it ever did. For the overman— constituted as an independent, detached type—refers simultaneously to a spiritual disposition and to the residence of free spirits in a social space relatively insulated from reactive politics. The problem is that the disappearance of the relevant social preconditions confounds any division of humanity into two spiritual types. If there is anything in the type to be admired, the ideal must be dismantled as a distinct caste of solitary individuals and folded into the political fabric of late-modern society. The "overman" now falls apart as a set of distinctive dispositions concentrated in a particular caste or type, and its spiritual qualities migrate to a set of dispositions that may compete for presence in any self. The type now becomes (as it already was to a significant degree) a voice in the self contending with other voices, including those of ressentiment. This model is implicitly suggested by Foucault when he eschews the term "overman" (as well as "will to power") and shifts the center of gravity of Nietzschean discourse from heroes and classical tragic figures to everyday misfits such as AlexiAlexina and Pierre Riviere. These textual moves are, I think, part of a strategy to fold Nietzschean agonism into the fabric of ordinary life by attending to' the extraordinary character of the latter. I seek to pursue this same trail. The Nietzschean conception of a few who overcome resentment above politics while the rest remain stuck in the muck of resentment in politics is not today viable on its own terms. Today **circumstances require that many give the sign of the overman a presence in themselves and in the ethicopolitical orientations they project onto the life of the whole.** But **this break with the spirit of Nietzsche requires further elucidation. The shift results partly from the late-modern possibility of self-extinction. In this new world the failure to "preserve man" could also extinguish the human basis for the struggle Nietzsche named "overman." Preservation and overcoming are now drawn closer together so that each becomes a term in the other: the latter cannot succeed unless it touches the former**. But the entanglement of each with the other in sociopolitical relations means, when the logic of this entanglement is worked out, that the "overman"' as a type cannot eliminate from its life some of the modalities definitive of the "human." If the overman was ever projected as a distinct type—and this is not certain—it now becomes refigured into a struggle within the self between the inclination to existential resentment and an affirmation of life that rises above this tendency.

**Preventing human extinction is key to ethics.**

Nick **Bostrom**, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute, and Director of the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology at the University of Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the London School of Economics, **2011** (“The Concept of Existential Risk,” Draft of a Paper published on ExistentialRisk.com, Available Online at <http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html>, Accessed 07-04-2011)

We have thus far considered existential risk from the perspective of utilitarianism (combined with several simplifying assumptions). We may briefly consider how the issue might appear when viewed through the lenses of some other ethical outlooks. For example, the philosopher Robert Adams outlines a different view on these matters. I believe **a better basis for ethical theory** in this area **can be found in** quite a different direction—in **a commitment to the future of humanity as a vast project, or network of overlapping projects, that is generally shared by the human race. The aspiration for a better society**—more just, more rewarding, and more peaceful—**is a part of this project. So are the potentially endless quests for scientific knowledge and philosophical understanding, and the development of artistic and other cultural traditions. This includes** the particular cultural traditions to which we belong, in all their accidental historic and ethnic diversity. It also includes **our interest in the lives of our children and grandchildren, and the hope that they will be able**, in turn, **to have the lives of their children and grandchildren as projects. To the extent that a policy or practice seems likely to be favorable or unfavorable to the carrying out of this complex of projects in the nearer or further future, we have reason to pursue or avoid it**. … **Continuity is as important to our commitment to the project of the future of humanity as it is to our commitment to the projects of our own personal futures. Just as the shape of my whole life, and its connection with my present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of any isolated experience, so too the shape of human history over an extended period of the future, and its connection with the human present and past, have an interest that goes beyond that of the** (total or average) **quality of life of a population-at-a-time, considered in isolation from how it got that way**. **We owe**, I think, some **loyalty to this project of the human future. We** also **owe it a respect that we would owe it even if we were not of the human race ourselves**, but beings from another planet who had some understanding of it. (28: 472-473) **Since an existential catastrophe would either put an end to the project of the future of humanity or drastically curtail its scope for development, we** would seem to **have a strong prima facie reason to avoid it**, in Adams’ view. We also note that **an existential catastrophe would entail the frustration of many strong preferences**, suggesting that from a preference-satisfactionist perspective it would be a bad thing. In a similar vein, **an ethical view emphasizing that public policy should be determined through informed democratic deliberation by all stakeholders would favor existential-risk mitigation § Marked 16:24 § if we suppose**, as is plausible, **that a majority of the world’s population would come to favor such policies upon reasonable deliberation** (even if hypothetical future people are not included as stakeholders). **We might also have custodial duties to preserve the inheritance of humanity passed on to us by our ancestors and convey it safely to our descendants**.[24] **We do not want to be the failing link in the chain of generations, and we ought not to delete or abandon the great epic of human civilization that humankind has been working on for thousands of years, when it is clear that the narrative is far from having reached a natural terminus**. Further, **many theological perspectives deplore naturalistic existential catastrophes, especially ones induced by human activities**: If God created the world and the human species, one would imagine that He might be displeased if we took it upon ourselves to smash His masterpiece (or if, through our negligence or hubris, we allowed it to come to irreparable harm).[25]

**Modern tech & nuclear weapons mean we can’t afford to live beyond good and evil – ethical norms are key to prevent the apocalypse.**

**Fasching, 93**

professor in USF's religious studies department – 1993 (Darrell, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima : Apocalypse or Utopia?, Pg. 28)

**Our modern technological civilization offers us seemingly infinite utopian opportunities to recreate ourselves (e.g., genetic engineering, behavioral engineering) and our societies (social engineering) and our world (chemical engineering, atomic engineering). But having transcended all limits and all norms, we seem bereft of a normative vision to govern the use of our utopian techniques. This normlessness threatens us with demonic self-destruction. It is this dark side of technical civilization that was revealed to us not only at Auschwitz and but also at Hiroshima.** Auschwitz represents a severe challenge to the religious traditions of the West: to Christians, because of the complicity of Christianity in the anti-Judaic path that led to Auschwitz renders its theological categories ethically suspect; to Jews, because their victim status presses faith in the God of history and in humanity to the breaking point. But the path to Auschwitz, and from Auschwitz to Hiroshima, represents a challenge, equally severe, for the scientific and technical, secular culture of the Enlightenment. We do not seem to have fared any better under a secular ethic than we did under a religious one. Indeed we have fared worse. Genocide it seems is a unique product of the modern secular world and its technically competent barbarians. Auschwitz stands for a demonic period in modern Western civilization in which the religious, political and technological developments converged to create a society whose primary purpose was the most efficient organization of that entire society for the purpose of exterminating all persons who were regarded as aliens and strangers—especially the Jews. **The Nazi vision of the pure Aryan society represents a utopian vision of demonic proportions—a vision that inspired an apocalyptic revolutionary program of genocide. It reveals at once both a time of "The Death of God" in the Nietzschean sense and yet the resurgence of religion**, that is, a demonic religiosity that creates a new public order in which all pluralism is eliminated from the public square and in which virtually nothing is sacred—not even human life. **The period of the Holocaust stands as prophetic warning to a technological civilization that has no other norm than the will to power**. If § Marked 16:21 § Auschwitz embodies the demonic use of technology against targeted populations to commit genocide, Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent the last such use of technology. **For with the coming of Nuclear warfare, technology has outstripped human intentionality so that if the bomb is ever used again, genocide will be transformed into collective suicide or omnicide—the destruction of all life. Having enemies is a luxury no community on the face of the earth can any longer afford**

**Perm: both. We can combine the affirmative with the alternative – if the alt solves then it can solve any residual links.**

**Perm: affirm the plan and the 1ac as a life affirming narrative and will this affirmation eternally.**

**The plan is just another mask for the alternative. The political rhetoric of the 1ac is a means to conceal the life affirming wisdom of the alternative.**

**Sinnerbrink** **2k2**

[robert, university of Sydney, july 3, http://www.usyd.edu.au/contretemps/3July2002/sinnerbrink.pdf, ““We Hyperboreans”: Platonism and Politics in Heidegger and Nietzsche”]

**The philosopher as legislator has overcome the finite historical series of human perspectives or types, and from this Hyperborean vantage point can engage in the world-building task of creating new values. The Nietzschean Hyperborean assumes the multifarious masks of historical Spirit**, forges new values with the hammer of philosophy, and thereby takes retrospective responsibility for the “total development of humankind.” **What I am calling Nietzsche’s political Platonism thus provides a way of understanding what he calls “Grand Politics.**” In short, **if the task of the philosopher is to legislate for the future, this political task necessarily requires a dual or doubled philosophical rhetoric. Nietzsche’s advocacy of the distinction between exoteric and esoteric perspectives becomes crucial here.** This distinction, Nietzsche tells us, was formerly known to philosophers—“among the Indians as among the Greeks, Persians, and Muslims, in short, whenever one believed in an order of rank and not in equality of rights.”28 But this order of rank has been obliterated by the levelling effects of Socratic dialectics and modern egalitarianism. **Nietzsche** thus **advocates a return to exoteric and esoteric perspectives, which I interpret to mean that the philosophical wisdom of the Hyperborean, the supra-historical comprehension of nihilism, must be distinguished from its translation into the political rhetoric of life-affirming illusion. In order to do so**, however, **the philosopher must wear various masks: esoteric philosophical wisdom must be concealed behind the mask of exoteric doctrine or political rhetoric. The philosopher-creator must translate the esoteric wisdom of the Hyperborean into an exoteric rhetoric suitable for the philosophical education or paidieia of the non-philosophical publicum. In short, Nietzsche must write in such a way that the esoteric truth will be recognized by the supra-historical Hyperborean, while the therapeutic exoteric doctrine will affirmed by the non-philosopher still caught within the finite historical perspectives of modern nihilism.** This ultimately Platonic theme is repeated constantly throughout Nietzsche’s published texts. One striking example, from Human-All-too-Human, has Nietzsche’s esoteric Hyperborean (B) in dialogue with his non-Hyperborean—or Human-all-too-Human—alter-ego (A): Stylistic caution: A: But if everyone knew this most would be harmed by it. You yourself call these opinions dangerous for those exposed to danger, and yet you express them in public? B: I write in such a way that neither the mob, nor the populi, nor the parties of any kind want to read me. Consequently these opinions of mine will never become public. A: But how do you write, then? B: Neither usefully nor pleasantly—to the trio I have named.2

**Nietzschean philosophies asymmetrically privilege transcendent concerns over experience, precluding any involvement or explanation from the human community.**

**Matthews 2k7**

[richard, “the limits of transcendence”, phaenex 2, no. 1, spring/summer 2007]

Since it is a central concept of this paper, I want to briefly define the notion of an asymmetrical privilege. **To privilege** authentic reflection presupposes the identification of philosophy with transcendental reflection; it also assumes its priority over mundane experience. Philosophies are asymmetrically privileged when they restrict philosophy solely to transformative reflection about that which is. Furthermore they see the value of empirical facts, mundane senses of truth and historical **events as non-philosophical. At best they are a clue to authentic reflection. The asymmetry occurs in the judgment of the relative importance of the philosophical and non-philosophical spheres. Heideggerian and Nietzschean philosophy is asymmetrically privileged because the everyday sphere is in various ways inferior a priori to genuine reflection. The everyday requires the revisions provided by philosophical reflection, but contains no resources within it to limit the creative philosophical acts of § Marked 16:23 § transformative thinkers**. In asymmetrically privileged reflection, the point is to transcend the limitations of experience, not with a view to final escape (since that is impossible) but rather with a view to novel philosophical reflection and the more or less abrupt emergence of a new everyday community or world. What makes the reflection asymmetrical is that **there is no reverse obligation on the part of the philosopher to treat those contingent details as themselves constituting limits that the transformative thinker ought to respect. Philosophies are asymmetrically privileged when they treat the metaphysical speculation as the priority, when they display a**n insouciant, **dismissive attitude towards commonsense reasoning, towards truths, and** most importantly, **when they treat the specific truths, historical experiences, sufferings, and violence experienced and inflicted by individuals and communities as philosophically secondary if not utterly irrelevant**. This attitude is widespread and cuts across philosophical traditions. **It characterizes positivist eliminations of moral and aesthetic norms, beliefs and propositions from the cognitive sphere as much as the Nietzschean move from herd morality to the transformation of values instantiated by the Übermensch; the norms and practices of the herd out of which he emerges are no constraint on his creativity. His reflection is understood to be already beyond legitimation by the norms of the herd.** In Heidegger, we see an analogous privilege in the move from ontic to ontological and beyond to the primordial conditions of emergence of a novel transformation in a community’s understanding of the meaning of Being. The community following to which he grants resistance (better its “independent power” or Eigenkraft) is a community that listens to transformative thinkers and statesmen; it neither criticizes nor opposes. Its role is to understand, not to resist (Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University” 38). The problem is that **nothing counts as a limit on what can be said except the so-called matter for thinking itself, whatever that might be. Since that matter is defined as beyond the normal ken of a given human community, the specific experiences, norms and practices of that community have nothing really to contribute to philosophical understanding and hence are bracketed a priori; a thinker must neither account for nor respond to them**. In consequence, concepts of individual rights and freedoms are barriers to creative activity, a conclusion that Heidegger explicitly draws in his 1936 lectures on Schelling. Heidegger asserts that the freedom of choice that underpins modern liberalism is an illusory doctrine that plays havoc in morality and law (Heidegger, Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom 15-16).

**Absolute or transcendent truths are distinct from factual claims. Making historically bound, factual claims are key to avoiding conditions of violence and tyranny.**

**Matthews 2k7** [richard, “the limits of transcendence”, phaenex 2, no. 1, spring/summer 2007]

To be genuinely revolutionary, a text has to be sensitive and honest about the historical facts of a given time and place. Absolute truths are ideologies and express the contingent beliefs of individuals in contexts in which they may be using those ideologies as legitimating features for various actions. In a sense, **absolute or transcendent ideologies are dishonest because they fail to recognize the sense in which they are limited by local historical conditions and circumstances**. They are sceptical failures that make a false claim to transcend natural human limitations. **However, we do not have access to transcendent truths. But facts are different. There are factual truths**, an indeterminately large set of them, **and they are crucial for judgment and behaviour.** Furthermore **it is possible for us to know them, even if we are likely to be uncertain** in any given case**. If we give up on truth, on logic, on facts, then we create the conditions for violence and tyranny**. For Camus even an utterance as trivial as a true predication of the colour of the sky is morally important and it is morally essential that we be able to assert it. **To appreciate this, consider Winston’s struggles to preserve his knowledge while undergoing torture in 1984. Winston has seen proof that the evidence against three men who had been executed for treachery was false. In particular there was a crucial photograph. “It exists!” he cried. “No,” said O’Brien**. He stepped across the room. There was a memory hole in the opposite wall. O’Brien lifted the grating. Unseen, **the** frail slip of **paper** was whirling away on the current of warm air; it **was vanishing in a flash of flame**. O’Brien turned away from the wall. “**Ashes,” he said**. “Not even identifiable ashes. Dust. **It does not exist. It never existed.” “But it did exist! It does exist! It exists in memory. I remember it. You remember it.” “I do not remember it,” said O’Brien** (Orwell 248). **Winston seeks to preserve his knowledge of that evidence. The truth matters to him and his commitment to it is precisely what O’Brien seeks to destroy at this point in the torture session**. O’Brien seeks to control language and to shape it for his political ends. **O’Brien relativizes truth to his own specific political ambitions and ties truth to the historical movement to which he is loyal. He has both an absolute historical narrative, and a belief in the relativity of specific mundane truths.** Opposing an O’Brien presupposes that he lies, hides truths and destroys evidence, or spins truth claims into vacuity. **To resist an O’Brien requires a commitment to historical truths. O’Brien is a classic case of the kind of absolutist** that Camus most fundamentally rejects—the individual who allows his absolute historical narrative to legitimate torture and murder. But to resist such people we can neither be absolutist nor relativist. **Whatever possibilities of** moral **resistance there are depend** at least partly **on recognizing the way in which violence and evil-doing are real specific events about which lies are told. Opposition to them both requires us to be able to recognize that they happen and the ability to expose lies as they are told. In both cases, truth is essential**.

# 1AR 2NR was Nietzsche, Case